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Acc. No.	13598
Class No.	D.31.
Book No.	28

PREFACE

TO ENGLISH EDITION

FOR twenty years three great democracies—England, France and the United States—were dominant to an extent that placed in their hands the fashioning of the world. Their ministration produced three great despotisms—Germany, Italy and Japan. Desirous of maintaining world stability, they have seen the destruction of Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria and Czechoslovakia, and China and Spain overrun by violence. Desirous of peace, they see force the universally accepted instrument of national policy, and peoples everywhere impoverished to provide more and ever more instruments of war. Under the stress of peril and crisis, governments demand all and personal liberty is compromised or lost.

Throughout these twenty years England, France and the United States have studiously refrained from acts of aggression. They have earnestly and sincerely preached peace. It is tragic that good intentions have borne such fruit.

The cause is simple and fundamental. There has been a grave misconception of the nature of peace. Peace has been identified with the ability of a few satisfied powers to maintain the *status quo*. Appeal to force is the inevitable product of a world society made up of sovereign states, as between which there exists no rule of law and over which there presides no

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superior authority to balance the static and dynamic desires which are characteristic of any society. It is apparent that the attainment of an harmonious world requires evolution away from the sovereignty system as it is now practised. H

The thoughts expressed in this volume were put on paper nearly a year ago and it might seem that subsequent events have destroyed the utility of this attempt at dispassionate analysis of basic problems. Rather, I feel that it has become indispensable that we think on such lines. To be sure, the world is now witnessing the active and extremist phase of the revolt of the dynamic powers against a rigid world system. Violence is rife, war may become general, and it is inevitable that our thoughts should be engrossed by the events of the day which press upon us.

But more than ever is it vital that the democracies should have a faith which leads to common purpose and justifies common sacrifice. The democracies will be divided and weak if they rely upon peril as their common bond. For peril is recognized in varying degrees and those who feel themselves to be relatively remote will be relatively indifferent. Nor can the democracies find spiritual unity in a world system wherein peace consists of the power to suppress those who desire change. It is apparent that such a system breeds revolt and contains in itself the seeds of its own destruction. If the democracies are not to succumb, physically and in spirit, to hostile forces, they require a new and enlightened philosophy.

It is at such a juncture that democracy must justify itself. At the cost of weakness in certain respects, it has encouraged individual freedom and the flexibility of mind which is the

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by now be well aware of the fact that simple and direct solutions are apt to prove illusory. We cannot expect to eradicate a system as fundamental as war unless we will take the trouble to study its origins and causes, and be willing to learn and apply the lessons taught by centuries of experimentation with the elimination of violence as between individuals or small groups.

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Each took what he could and kept his possessions until someone more capable appeared to dispossess him.

Often, too, force was resorted to to solve differences in the spiritual realm. Believers in "false" gods were eliminated, or by torture or threats led to recant and accept the "true" faith. Religious persecution and religious wars were of frequent occurrence.

The "force" system was obviously unsatisfactory. Even the bravest and strongest could get small satisfaction out of a system wherein his personal safety, his enjoyment of his possessions and even his spiritual liberty, depended upon constant vigilance and the willingness and ability to resort to physical force and when there was the constant apprehension that a braver or stronger would appear to disturb. There inevitably grew up a demand for a social mechanism which would permit human beings to derive the advantages of association without incurring the acute disadvantages incident to force being the only method of resolving the conflicts which were the inevitable incidents of association.

The history of the human race is largely a history of the effort to reconcile selfishness with gregariousness. The elimination of the war system is the final and most difficult phase of this age-long effort. If the final effort is to be successful it will only be by realizing that we are dealing with a part of a single problem which has long troubled society, but which we have measurably learned to solve.

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PRINCIPLES OF SOLUTION

THERE have been repeated trial and error in the effort to organize society so that conflicting desires would not entail resort to force as the solvent. Such efforts as have been attended with success fall within one of two categories. There are, as one category, those efforts which are primarily directed to states of mind. It is sought to mould the human spirit so that desires will either be so diluted in intensity or so metamorphosed in character that conflicts of desire will be minimized. There are, as a second category, those efforts which are primarily directed to creating a scheme of society (a "polity") which provides substitutes for force as the solvent of conflicting desires. Here the presence of conflicting desires is assumed and accepted, but human conduct, as impelled by these desires, is sought to be canalized into non-violent channels.

Efforts of the first category we shall call "ethical" and those of the second category, "political" or "authoritarian."¹

¹ Both the words "political" and "authoritarian" have undesired connotations. We mean those procedures which involve a conscious grouping together of human beings and the emergence within the group of elements having a duty of initiative for the common welfare coupled with authority not enjoyed by the group members as individuals. It can be otherwise described as a commonwealth, or polity organized for the common welfare.

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The terminology is, of course, arbitrary. It is not intended to suggest that "ethical" efforts may not emanate from or have the sanction of authority, be it human or divine. Also it is not intended to suggest that political authorities are unconcerned with ethical considerations.

The "ethical" approach assumes many forms—some negative and some positive. As a negative solution it would suppress desires which are of such a type that their fulfillment leads almost inevitably to human conflict. Many religions, for example, primarily emphasize the renunciation of material things. Poverty and chastity are encouraged. Worldliness is decried.

In addition to such negative manifestations, the "ethical" solution would affirmatively create desires which are susceptible of fulfillment without human conflict. Spiritual desires, in contradistinction to material desires, can be realized by all, as there is no finite limitation upon the possibilities of satisfaction. Such desires may, indeed, take a form such that they can be satisfied only by satisfying the needs of others. This is often loosely referred to as "unselfishness." There may be inculcated into man so keen a sense of duty to his fellow-man that satisfaction is obtained primarily as that duty is discharged.

Indubitably the ethical solution has served largely to minimize the occasions for force. There are myriad persons who have been so spiritually moulded as to lessen the engendering of desires which would bring conflict with the desires of others. There are many who have developed a high sense of duty to others and who have found self-satisfaction primarily

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in the effort to discharge that duty. To that fact mankind can ascribe much of that social peace, which it has, at various times and at various places, enjoyed.

However, it has not yet proved practical in any large group to rely wholly upon the "ethical" solution. Desires persist of a character that lead to conflict. Such desires cannot be wholly suppressed or supplanted. At best "unselfishness" has played an important role in mitigating the intensity of the problem. Since the problem still remains, it has proved necessary concurrently to seek alternative ways of solution. Such ways have, in the main, been of the kind which we have termed "political" or "authoritarian." Human beings who sought the benefit of association together have through conscious decision or unconscious evolution organized themselves into a polity, usually with some governing authority. This authority has had the duty to familiarize itself with the various desires and needs of its group, to appraise the possibility of their being satisfied and reconciled, and to prescribe rules of conduct, consonant with the *mores* of the community, which would be calculated to permit the maximum of satisfaction, or the minimum of dissatisfaction. Once such rules are promulgated, the alternative procedure of violence can be, and is, banned. The political authority is given by the group the right and the means to enforce its rules and to compel, in lieu of individual resort to violence, the utilization of the peaceful procedures laid down by the authority.

An added function sometimes assumed by the political authority is to seek to enhance the quantum of material things available to satisfy material desires. In this way, it is

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thought, there may be brought about some lessening of the conflict of desires.

As we have observed, the "ethical" and "political" solutions are essentially different. The one involves primarily the attainment of a spiritual state conducive to harmony with one's fellows. Satisfaction is rendered possible by the suppressing of certain types of desire or by the developing of new desires reconcilable with the desires of others. The political solution, on the other hand, operates essentially in terms of conduct rather than of states of mind. Rules are set up to determine what acts are permissible to gratify desires and what acts must be suppressed. Outward conformity with such rules is usually sufficient even though such conformity be accompanied by inward rebelliousness.

While thus the "ethical" and "political" solutions are essentially different in their approach and essentially supplementary to each other, in practice they are frequently combined. Religions, for example, while usually promoting the "ethical" solution, have in many of their manifestations adopted an "authoritarian" viewpoint.

Whatever may be the origins of religions or their avowed goal, in their development they have tended to advance what we have defined as the "ethical" solution. The element of sacrifice, present in most religions at their origin, is often encouraged along lines which facilitate solution of the problem of conflicting human desires. It is sought to create a new state of mind, such that certain desires are suppressed or supplanted by new desires which are non-conflicting or which may even call for the giving of satisfaction to others. But

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most religions, as they become older, also tend to become ritualistic. Conduct in prescribed ways is regarded, first, as a test of the desired state of mind, then as an end in itself. As this occurs religions partake less of the "ethical," as we have defined this term for our present purposes.

On the other hand political authorities have frequently utilized the "ethical" concept. Temporal rulers have seldom confined themselves to prescribing formal rules of conduct. They have habitually sought also to inculcate idealism—of one kind or another—among their people. Often, in aid of these efforts, such rulers have claimed for themselves divine authority and asserted the power, as God's agent, to rule the soul as well as the ~~body~~ of their subjects.

Fascism and communism exemplify modern efforts to combine the ethical and authoritarian solutions. Under these systems of government, the human authorities assume primary responsibility for inculcating in the individual a spirit of self-sacrifice, and of self-subordination and cooperation in promoting what is conceived as the welfare of the group. The functioning of religious leaders is discouraged, since their conception of the object of sacrifice may not coincide with that of the group authority.

Not only do we thus find spiritual leaders concerning themselves with human conduct, and secular leaders concerning themselves with human states of mind, but we find an inherent interconnection. The rules which the human authority can usefully enunciate must, as we have observed, be consonant with the *mores* of the community. These in turn

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are largely formed by the ethical conceptions which from time to time prevail.

It is not often that we find either the "ethical" or the "political" solutions in pure or isolated form. States of mind and rules of conduct are usually confused in practice and both methods of solution generally operate concurrently. Accordingly it is not practical to appraise their relative effectiveness in eliminating force. There is really no occasion for us to seek to do so. It is enough that we can confidently assert that such progress as has been made in the elimination of individual resort to force is ascribable to one or another or both of these solutions. This must be so. We predicate the fact of human association. This, to some extent, is inevitable. We predicate the further fact of human desires. This, again, is the natural, normal state. From these two premises we must proceed—*one*, by so moulding the human spirit that desires tend to become reconcilable and harmonious, and *two*, by providing some alternative to force as the way of determining which, of subsisting conflicting desires, shall prevail.

The only other approach which, logically, might operate as a solution is the providing of sufficient material things so that all material desires can be satisfied. This solution, often tried, has consistently proved illusory.

There are several reasons why this is so. One is that a basic material desire is effortless possession and enjoyment. This is inherently impossible of general attainment. If an entire population achieved such apparent wealth that no one worked, obviously there would not be available either the

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current production or the personal service necessary for enjoyment by any. Further, material wants are not absolute, in the sense that they can be satisfied by any predetermined quantum. They are essentially relative. Once a subsistence level has been attained, the material desire is apt to be expressed in terms of an ambition to be better off than one's fellows. There is little evidence to support the conclusion that satisfaction can be permanently increased, and conflict of desire eliminated, merely by raising the general standard of living.

Having thus explored the basic problem and the routes by which alone it can be solved, we must consider further the practical development thereof.

It is obvious that the desired results have measurably been achieved. There are millions of people who live for years in close association and interdependence without thought of force as the solvent of their conflicting individual desires.² This is in itself evidence of the fact that much has been done to mould human desires into forms such that many can be

² For the sake of clarity it should, perhaps, be noted at this point that when we speak of "force" and its eradication, we have in mind such force as serves to resolve *individual* conflicts of desire. There are, of course, occasional individual manifestations of force which occur when no differences exist to be reconciled. A homicidal maniac may kill quite without reason. Here force is not a solvent.

In any society such abnormalities will occur, although if the society is well organized they will seldom occur. Society must, of course, protect itself against such aberrations. But this is a special problem unrelated to that which we are studying.

We also here exclude force as employed by the group authority to prevent contraventions of its rules. This is necessary but, again, in a well ordered society the occasions for the use of such force will be small and limited to marginal abnormalities.

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satisfied otherwise than crudely at the expense of their fellow-men. It also proves that there are acceptable and feasible alternatives to force as the method of solving such conflicting desires as still persist. However, it is equally apparent that the results which have been achieved have not been projected into the international field. Neither the ethical nor political solutions operate, internationally, to achieve results comparable to those attained nationally. The nature and cause of these limitations we should consider.

III

PRESENT LIMITS OF THE ETHICAL SOLUTION

It is, happily, possible for most people to obtain some measure of satisfaction in ways which involve no conflict with the desires of others. Much satisfaction can, indeed, be obtained by working, without material compensation, to meet the needs of others. This fact undoubtedly plays a vital role in eliminating friction from human relationships. But the amount of satisfaction sought to be attained in this way is, in the present state of human development, still small in comparison with the satisfactions sought at the expense of others. Furthermore, there are many factors which limit the effective scope of the ethical concept.

First among such limiting factors, is that of geography. Self-satisfaction is apt to be derived from satisfying others only if the others be those whom, through personal contact, we have come to love, or at least know and like, and only if we can see for ourselves the gratification which we cause. There is satisfaction to be derived from an environment of content and to this there is a general disposition to contribute. But discontent beyond our ken is apt to be a matter of indifference. Also, we are prone to give to others under

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circumstances where some return, even if it be only gratitude, can be experienced. There are occasional persons of whom this is not true. The fact of doing good unto others is in itself a sufficient reward. But such lofty souls are all too few to disprove our generalization.

Thus it is that the "ethical" approach, in its simple form, is inadequate to cope with the larger problem of international relations. It is an important consideration in the family and in a group held together by frequent social intercourse. But effectiveness diminishes as the problem becomes one of maintaining harmony within a group the components of which are not in personal contact but where the association, if any, is almost exclusively economic.

If the ethical solution in its simple, individual form is limited to spheres of personal propinquity, it may, in organized form, attain a wider field of operation. This occurs when the willingness to sacrifice is put at the disposal of some abstract principle or ideal. Religions form the most usual vehicle for the projection of the ethical solution beyond national lines. This may not be their avowed objective. Religions often disclaim concern with the problems of man on earth, emphasizing the attainment of bliss hereafter. Even so, an incidental effect may be to enlarge the scope of the ethical solution. Thus, if a religion itself seeks universality, and if it seeks to spiritualize desires and to inculcate a willingness to sacrifice, then it cannot fail to project more broadly the ethical solution.

However, even religions do not suffice to make the ethical

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solution effective in the international field. This is due to a variety of causes.

Few religions conceive of their deity as concerned with the welfare of all mankind. Christianity has attained, at least in theory, the concept of a god whose interest is universal. This quality of universality, when it is genuinely accepted and practiced, undoubtedly serves to increase the effective range of the ethical solution. But most religions, in theory or in practice, conceive of their deity as having jurisdiction and interest substantially coterminous with that of the social group which worships it. Such a group is sometimes a national group. Sometimes it embraces more than one national group. But a single religious group never yet embraced all national groups.

Religions, as a vehicle for universalizing the ethical solution, are further deficient in consequence of a tendency to become identified with human authorities. This seems particularly to occur as religions prescribe ritual, or rules of conduct on earth, and invoke on their behalf penalties or rewards hereafter. Those who administer a religion of specific rewards and punishments tend to utilize such sanctions to secure for themselves temporal authority. In turn, secular rulers tend to be jealous of those who seek to control human conduct on earth by the administration of rewards and punishments. As religion assumes this form, political authorities seek to unite divine and human authority in their own persons. The use of religious sanctions to attain temporal authority occurred notably during certain periods of the Papacy and has been even more generally evidenced in the case of

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religions other than Christian. The assumption by secular rulers of divine authority has frequently occurred in the past and exists today in some countries.

As divine and secular authority become equated, religion ceases to be an effective medium for internationalizing the ethical solution. This is true not merely because such equating involves an inevitable decline in the spiritual influence of the divine authority, but because the sacrificial quality inculcated by most religions is then limited to the secular group with which the religion has become identified.

Further, religion, or any other abstract principle, fails to become a vehicle for universalizing the ethical solution if it itself appeals to force or coercion for its own advancement. Thus religions fail to advance the ethical solution when they seek to propagate themselves by a vivid portrayal of punishments which the deity is supposed to mete out to those who fail to worship him. This involves an inversion of the ethical solution. That solution would seek to harmonize desires as a *means* to an end, namely, the avoidance of force. But when a specific harmony of desires is sought as an *end*, not a means, and when force is accepted as a legitimate means for its achievement, then our problem is aggravated, not mitigated. We see "holy" wars, crusades, and persecutions, which, though involving a measure of self-sacrifice by individual participants, nevertheless constitute deplorable manifestations of mass violence.

Self-sacrifice can serve greatly to avoid violence consequent upon a clash of desires. But self-sacrifice does not in itself promote such avoidance. When the willingness to sacri-

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fice is put at the disposal of a religion or other "cause", this will not universalize the ethical solution unless the cause be one which itself rejects the use of forcible or coercive measures and espouses non-violent human intercourse as one of its ends. As a corollary of the foregoing, the religion or cause must not be equated with any human authority which itself, legitimately, uses force to achieve its ends.

In addition to being restricted by geographical factors, not readily overcome, the ethical solution has been limited by a device which man himself has created, namely, the soulless being.

The invention of the body corporate has doubtless greatly facilitated the economic advancement of mankind. Through this means many individuals can associate themselves together for undertakings which are carried out by a purely juridical person. It functions through a management group sufficiently compact to be effective and without there being any personal liability or responsibility on the part of the many individuals thus associated. This has made possible the undertaking of countless enterprises which would have been barred as too grandiose, or hazardous, if all participants were personally to be responsible; or as impractical if all participants had a voice in current management. The corporation is an institution whereby capital is brought into fruitful cooperation with physical labor, providing tools of a quantity and quality such that production, per unit of labor, has enormously increased. There has been a corresponding

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increase in the quantum of material things available to satisfy human needs and desires. This has doubtless served to diminish conflicting desires and dissatisfactions.

On the other hand, as corporate activity replaces individual effort, the scope of the "ethical" solution is diminished. Corporations are deemed withdrawn from the influences of that principle. Material unselfishness is, as a matter of law, forbidden to business corporations. Their officers and directors are supposed to take only such action as, in their opinion, will advance the short term material interests of the shareholders.

Mr. Henry Ford conceived the vision of producing automobiles in such large volume that the benefits of mass production would permit, on the one hand, of high wages and, on the other hand, of low selling prices, putting a then luxury within the grasp of the working masses. To do so required, initially, the building up by the Ford Company of a large cash fund intended to finance a period of transition. Minority stockholders protested against cash being withheld from them in aid of realizing the goal which Mr. Ford had conceived for the corporation. The highest court of Michigan¹ upheld these minority stockholders. The opinion of the Court referred to Mr. Ford as having said, "My ambition is to employ still more men, to spread the benefit of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the greatest

¹ *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.*, 204 Mich. 459.

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share of our profits back in the business." The Court said that Mr. Ford's testimony also indicated "that he thinks the Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has had too large profits and that a sharing of them with the public by reducing the price of the output of the Company ought to be undertaken." The Court referred to the sentiments as being "philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to Mr. Ford," but pointed out that they could not properly be entertained by a body corporate. "A business corporation is organized and carried out primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes."

Perhaps the law takes this viewpoint because law largely developed alongside of religious beliefs which were dominated by the idea of rewards and punishments hereafter. The reason for acts of benevolence was deemed to be that they were the passport to heaven. But since corporations have no souls they cannot make transit to heaven or hell and enjoy its delights or suffer its pains. Therefore bodies corporate are immune from any moral law.

However this may be, once we admit of a juridical person, managed by trustees for the benefit of a group, serious practical obstacles arise to permitting the trustees to be "unselfish" at the expense of their *cestui qui trust*. It may well be that trustees should not be allowed to handle the funds of

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others in accordance with standards so uncertain and controversial as those which we call "ethical." It may be that material sacrifice designed to promote the welfare of others should be left to the individual decision of those at whose expense the sacrifice is made.

If, however, it is inevitable that business corporations be inhibited from acts of material unselfishness, it is not inevitable, or a logical consequence of the foregoing, that they should be cast in a role of narrow and anti-social selfishness. Yet this is the general conception. The business corporation is looked upon, and too often looks upon itself, as an entity whose primary function is the extraction from the community of sums to pay over to shareholders. The broad economic and social achievements which constitute the real justification for the corporate device are subordinated or disregarded.

In the international field, relations are only to a small degree personal. They are predominantly economic and handled by bodies corporate. There is thus little opportunity for material unselfishness to play an important role in mitigating conflicts of desire. There occur occasional gestures of generosity, as when the Red Cross contributes to alleviate some great disaster. There are some Foundations which work internationally to benefit the human race. There are missionary and educational activities which exemplify the spirit of unselfishness. But predominantly the impressions which one people form of another derive either superficially from holiday intercourse or from the conduct of business companies. These are not only legally inhibited from acts of material self-sacrifice, but they tend to portray themselves as predatory

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and exploitive in nature, even though their activities may in fact largely enhance the general welfare.

Business corporations are not the only juridical persons which operate to limit the influence of the ethical principle. Human authorities themselves largely fall in this category.

Whenever a person is selected to act in a representative capacity as part of a human authority he is supposed to act only on behalf of the group which selected him. The welfare of others outside of this group cannot properly be his concern. They presumably have their own authorities looking after their own group interests. The Governor of New York is not supposed to sacrifice, to the smallest degree, the material interests of the New Yorkers by whom he is chosen in order thereby to promote the welfare of the residents of the adjoining Province of Ontario. An American Congressman may feel that the general welfare would be promoted by a renunciation of the Allied war debts. But should he in his representative capacity vote to forego sums which if collectible would in part go to the financial relief of his constituents? The Constitution of the United States contains, to be sure, a "general welfare" clause,² but the welfare thereby envisaged is not truly "general" as for example is the case in the charter of the Rockefeller Foundation where it is specified that the purpose is "to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world."

² "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and *general welfare of the United States.*"

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A group authority, chosen to act in a representative capacity, is not deemed free to apply the "ethical solution" with universality.

There are doubtless many other factors which limit the universality of the "ethical solution." But those we have mentioned are, perhaps, the most important and serve adequately to explain the failure of this solution—useful in smaller groups—to eradicate force from the field of international relations. To summarize:

To the extent that human beings are disposed to subordinate their desires to those of others, it is in favor of others with whom they are in personal association. Religions have not served, to any large extent, to overcome this geographical limitation. Often they have operated to precipitate conflict by enlisting "unselfishness" to coerce others.

Further, economic relations between national groups are primarily conducted by bodies corporate, which, through the nature of their being, ignore "ethical" considerations.

Finally, the political affairs of the nations and their relations with each other are administered by persons acting in a representative capacity and who, in such capacity, are not deemed to have any mandate to sacrifice for the general welfare the specific interests of the group which has placed them in a position of authority.

IV.

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WE HAVE seen that, as people were drawn together, there was a clash of irreconcilable desires and force was the first arbiter between them. We have noted that the solution of force involved so many dissatisfactions as in itself largely to nullify the advantages obtainable from human association, and that the device of a human "authority" was generally resorted to.

The nature of the "authority" has varied with differences in the nature and size of the group by which the authority was established. In the family, the father or mother was usually the "authority," subject to eventual emancipation of the children. As families came into contact and association with each other, still larger social groups came into being (as tribes, villages, etc.) and a new authority (as chieftain, mayor or board of aldermen) may have been set up. As villages or tribes developed contact and association with each other, new social groups came into being (as principalities or states) and a new authority (as a prince or governor) may have been set up. As states and principalities grew together

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into nations, a king or president or congress may have become established as the new superimposed authority.¹

Looking at such developments in retrospect, we can see that the human race has been able, to a remarkable degree, to find ways whereby its members can be useful one to another. This, in turn, has tended to widen the circle of association, particularly as new inventions have largely bridged the gaps originally incident to geographical separation. Under this influence, small units have progressively felt it advantageous to be closely associated with other units, thereby forming larger groups. But in each case it has developed that such broader association could only realize its full potentialities of good if a polity were created with some arbiter, some "authority," to provide and enforce rules, in substitution for individual force, to reconcile the inevitable new conflicts which were the accompaniment of each new association. It is through such processes that we today have a world of nations, each of which has a system of supreme authority superimposed upon a multitude of subordinate and more localized authorities.

Why is it that this process has virtually stopped at its present stage of development? Why have we no supreme international authority, superimposed on the several national authorities? These are questions the answers to which we must seek.

A first explanation is doubtless to be found in the fact that as a polity is enlarged the burdens of its authorities

¹ While certain titles are here used for purposes of illustration, we intend the word "authority" to comprehend the entire system of government, including the judiciary.

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rapidly increase to a point which endangers successful performance. This is particularly true as society has become more complex and as science has multiplied the ways of human association and created interrelations such that all acts have increasingly wide and intricate repercussions.

When a group is small and primitive, the task of the "authority" is relatively simple. He owes his existence to the fact that his group wishes to avoid violence among themselves. The desire to live is usually the most intense of all human desires. The satisfaction obtainable by taking human life is relatively less intense and desirable. Therefore the first duty of an arbiter is to decide that, within his group, the desire to live must be given the right of way over the desire to take life.

Property rights are the next concern. Since the possession of property gives little enjoyment if it must be constantly protected against theft or violent destruction, rules are promulgated to secure such protection.

But as the group becomes larger and more heterogeneous, and its relations more complex, the nature of the problem changes. The original, primitive, rules still hold good, but become inadequate. A minimum of food, clothing and shelter are necessary for the normal prolongation of human life. Direct interference with these can be prevented. But in a highly organized society, many acts, seemingly innocent, may have the indirect and unintended effect of causing great suffering for many without comparable satisfaction for the few. Thus the task of appraising relative satisfactions and dissatisfactions, of diagnosing cause and effect, and of

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prescribing rules calculated to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, becomes a task of great difficulty.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that its component elements are in constant flux. Human desires are constantly changing, both as to their intensity and their objectives. Even where these remain constant, other conditions change so that the same rules cannot be relied upon always to produce uniform results.

Further, change is in itself a prime *desideratum* with many, just as a maintenance of the *status quo* is a *desideratum* with others. It is necessary that the rules be such as to maintain a reasonable balance between these opposing and partially irreconcilable desires.² If the form of society be capitalistic, it is necessary that effort be induced by an opportunity of reward in the form of material benefits and that these benefits should to an extent be at the expense of those whose efforts have subsided or become less effective. Some period and degree of effortless enjoyment must also be permitted or else we impair the incentive to create and acquire. On the

² We hereafter use the terms "static" and "dynamic" to describe these opposing tendencies. The terminology is admittedly arbitrary, but seems preferable to "haves" and "have-nots," which is even more inaccurate in its connotations. By "static" we refer to those who are sufficiently satisfied with what they have—in the way of possessions or opportunities—not to want any important change in the structure of the society in which they live. By "dynamic" we refer to those who desire the structure of their society to be changed or their group enlarged in order to give greater scope to their energy or adventurous disposition or in the hope of thereby improving, relatively or absolutely, their material or social status. The fact that a person belongs to the "static" group does not necessarily imply any lack of physical energy or ambition.

We refer to nations as "static" or "dynamic" according to the preponderant characteristics of their members. But of course all states embrace both static and dynamic elements.

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other hand, there must, through the creation and maintenance of opportunity, be a possibility of peacefully diminishing the advantages of those who have theretofore acquired, relative to those whose energies and ambitions are such that they will not be satisfied unless they can enhance their own position. Even the grant of opportunity is not in itself sufficient to insure an absence of violence. There are many who have not the capacity to take advantage of opportunities. To avoid violence by these, and by those for whom adequate opportunity cannot be created, there must, through taxation or other acts of government, be a peaceful taking away, or a restraint on exploitation, for the benefit of the so-called underprivileged.

It is thus apparent that the achievement of "collective security" becomes difficult and inevitably qualified. Indeed the phrase itself becomes misleading and dangerous. For there cannot be any "security" in a complete sense. Security in certain respects can be achieved but only at the expense of insecurity in other respects. The particular form of security which society preponderantly wants is freedom from violent attack upon person and property. The form of insecurity which must be provided as the counterpart is insecurity with respect to indefinitely retaining, exploiting and passing on without impairment or subtraction all that one has or can acquire by measures short of force.

The achievement of a state of "insecurity" which is adequate and not excessive is the really difficult task of the authority. In contrast therewith the task of achieving the desired "security" is simple, at least as to procedure. The

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procedure is that of direct prevention through some form of public force and some system of punishing those who, by violent acts, transgress the prescribed rules of conduct. But such methods (often referred to as "sanctions") are effective only within narrow limits. They can permanently cope only with a small quantum of potential violence. It is the task of authority, by striking a fair balance between static and dynamic, to prevent the growth of violent tendencies on the part of great numbers. Only if this can be done will sanctions serve. They become, in the long run, impotent if the disposition to violence extends to more than a marginal element of the social group.

The problem of creating "insecurity" to counterbalance and to make possible "security" is one of great intricacy. Involved in it are economic factors which are as yet little understood. It cannot easily be predicted in advance what form or degree of "insecurity" is appropriate. If the "insecurity" is inadequate then the dynamic groups, driven by their own ambition, and the under-privileged groups, driven by their own need, will threaten that type of security—freedom from personal violence—which we would achieve. They will threaten it in a measure which no sanctions can control. If the "insecurity" is excessive, then it impairs the incentive to work and produce, needs are more difficult to satisfy, and there is initiated a vicious circle which is equally certain to jeopardize the attainment of our objective. There may even be resort to violence by the *status quo* elements.

The attainment of "insecurity" in proper form and measure thus becomes a task of great difficulty. As the scope of

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the polity increases so does the task of its authorities become more difficult.

No nation of large population and complex economy can claim to have found a method of assuring a political system which will perfectly perform its intended function. Each nation has a scheme of its own which, it is hoped, will produce the desired results. Each system differs from every other, and doubtless should differ since the nature of the problem and of the people is different. Only one thing can be asserted with reasonable confidence. There is no political administration which can be sure of indefinitely satisfying those who have set it up. Sooner or later failure is inevitable as a result of misjudging the weight of conflicting desires, or misjudging the means of satisfying those that predominate. It is equally inevitable that when failure occurs there will be an effort to change the "authority." Therefore, if civil war is to be avoided, there must be provided a peaceful means for periodically changing the nature and personnel of the "authority." Such provision for change brings, however, its own new problem. It creates a tendency on the part of political authorities to conceive of their tasks in terms of short range results, in an effort to placate those particular forces which most imminently threaten an overturning of the authority. Thus, successive authorities are apt to find their tasks made progressively more difficult by the short range policies of their predecessors.

The difficulties which inherently beset the successful operation of a polity which has grown to national dimensions

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suggest why the political solution has not yet been extended to the world of nations. A further difficulty arises in consequence of the fact that each group authority depends upon a feeling, on the part of its group members, that there exist other groups which are hostile, or at least competitive.

Group authorities could effectively discharge their arbitral functions without regard to the existence or non-existence of other groups. But authorities seek to develop for themselves a role far transcending that which explains their being. This is due to the operation of one or another of two deeply rooted human traits. In the first place, those who possess power almost invariably seek to enlarge and perpetuate their power. This they can most readily do by picturing external dangers. These are pointed to as requiring large concentration of powers in the group authority. Only thus, it is asserted, can the group be effectively organized to resist the threatened external danger. In the second place, individuals tend to personify the group authority and to identify themselves therewith to such an extent that they derive vicarious pride from the power and pomp displayed by their group authority, from its prestige in relation to that of other group authorities and from the deference seemingly accorded it by such others. They take satisfaction from the real or imagined superiority of their group over other groups. Thus the competitive instincts of group members are stimulated and, in turn, the effective functioning of the group authority is promoted.

The fact that the functioning of the "polity" system depends in part upon the existence of alien and competitive

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groups thus serves as a deterrent to the unification of the world as a single group with an overriding group authority. Unhappily we have not yet discovered and established contact with another inhabited universe, too removed to fight, but whose example might arouse our competitive instincts and stimulate us properly to organize our own world. We find our stimulus in a series of personifications, largely a product of the imagination, designed to portray one's own nation as endowed with virtues and other nations as evil and aggressive. Through dependence upon such artificial stimulation of internal (national) harmony, we engender international disharmony.

The accumulation of difficulties in the way of the operation of political authorities fairly raises the question of the extent to which the concept can usefully be further expanded at this time. We seem to be faced by a dilemma. Developments of science and invention constantly bring about closer contacts, and create possibilities of obtaining satisfactions from association with those who are geographically far removed and with whom there is no union through any common polity. Human nature urgently demands the opportunity to enjoy such associations and to obtain the satisfaction which can be derived therefrom. The mere fact that goods are of foreign and remote origin is in itself a source of satisfaction to many. That which is distant and unknown to the many constitutes a challenge to those of adventurous instinct. There is, however, the risk that far flung associations will create new clashes of irreconcilable desires, and that

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lasting benefit cannot be obtained therefrom unless there be established some "authority" to reconcile and arbitrate the differences.

We have seen that through the "polity" system mankind has, within limited and homogeneous groups, largely solved the basic problem of reconciling selfishness with gregariousness. If it has not always done so, the failure has been due to human failures. We have had sufficient experience to demonstrate that, except for abnormalities controllable by police power, individual group members will renounce force as the arbiter of their differences on the condition that some organic system is provided which will assure a reasonable compromise between the static and dynamic influences among them. However, as society becomes complex and ways of association are multiplied, the task of government grows more difficult. It seems already to have been expanded to the limits of successful performance. Furthermore, it is questionable whether, in our present state of mental development, the national group authority can perform all of the tasks which it assumes without invoking the stimulus derived from fear of the aggression of others. This creates a reluctance to dissipate such fear through internationalizing the device of the group authority.

The foregoing analysis shows the foundation for the three principal schools of thought which have developed in the field of international affairs. There are the "isolationists," who, broadly speaking, contend that the task of the national authority is already so difficult that it should not be extended into the broader field of international relations. Feeling that

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international contacts breed conflicts beyond the control of any practicable international authority, they would restrict such international contacts to a minimum, hoping thereby to achieve international peace. There are the "internationalists," who feel that it is either impracticable or unwise to avoid international contacts and who would forward their development by the creation of some form of world government or federation to cope with the inevitable conflicts of interest. There are those who feel that we must for the time being accept a continuance of the present situation, taking, on the one hand, the benefits of international association and, on the other hand, the burden and risks of the war system.

It would, however, be premature to conclude that at this stage we have sufficiently analyzed the problem to justify proceeding to consider solutions. There are two major phases which remain to be considered.

Of these the first is the role of treaties in stabilizing the relations between nations. Do treaties constitute, at least potentially, a body of international law upon which we can build international relationships without fear of violence?

In the second place, we must consider certain distinctive features of "totalitarian" war. These must be taken into account before we apply conclusions drawn from analogy to the use of force by individuals.

V

THE INADEQUACY OF TREATIES

IT APPEARS from our analysis in Chapters III and IV that man has failed to give universality to either line of solution which, within limited areas, serves to cope with the conflicts inherent in human association. There remains, however, a subject matter which we have not explored, namely, that of treaties. These are commonly looked upon as creating or being expressive of "international law."¹ Treaties are also looked upon as "sacred." "Sanctity of treaties" and "international law" are phrases commonly used and which evidence a popular belief that man has evolved in the international field ways of solution which partake of both the ethical and authoritarian principles. Misconception in this respect constitutes one of the most potent reasons for the mis-

¹ There exists also a body of so-called "international law" which constitutes, in essence, a code of good international practice. Nations which desire for their nationals the benefit of "antagonistic cooperation" with other peoples, tend to conform to such practices as a matter of practical expediency. They desire and expect reciprocal action by others. The field thus covered is primarily important to private international relations. Such so-called "international law" is not, however, so deeply rooted in the *mores* of the nations that it can withstand much strain. Nations which, like Russia and to some extent Mexico, have abandoned capitalistic concepts and practices, tend also to abandon this so-called "international law" which would circumscribe rather than promote their national policies.

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direction and consequent ineffectiveness of many peace efforts.

Treaties serve to define the domain and status of states as between themselves, and to determine their relations. They constitute law *within a nation* to the extent that the national authority requires of its group members compliance therewith. Between the nations themselves, however, political treaties fail to partake of those qualities which alone serve to make law an instrumentality for protecting society against violence.

We have seen how law functions to solve, within a group, the problem of violence. Law, from this viewpoint, is a body of rules laid down by group authority in the interest of the group members as a whole, and designed to avert the use of force by establishing conditions which acceptably balance the dynamic and static desires of the group members. These rules create a situation of organic elasticity and are themselves always susceptible of change by the authority. They are in fact frequently changed in order to preserve, in the face of changing conditions, that balance which is necessary if the rules of conduct are to be accepted as a substitute for force. If a balance within reasonable limits is not maintained force is again resorted to in the form of internal disorder, which may assume the proportions of civil war. Furthermore, force under such conditions is generally considered to have moral sanction. The right of revolution has never been abandoned. It exists as a potential, indispensable to preventing the rules of the authority becoming crystallized,

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under the temporary influence of some dominating faction, so as to create a lack of balance which is unbearable.

The rules of the authority, if they are to secure permanent peace within the group, must possess the following characteristics:

1. They must be formulated by a central authority which owes and feels a duty to the group as a whole and to all of its constituent parts.

2. They must create a condition of flexibility, which will give qualified and balanced satisfaction to both the dynamic and the static elements.

3. They must always be changeable and in fact be changed when they fail to provide the desired balance. Underlying conditions are constantly in flux and only through adaptation of the rules of conduct can a reasonable balance be preserved.

So-called international law, which is principally embodied in treaties, largely lacks each of these three characteristics indispensable to municipal law if it is to preserve peace within the group.

Treaties are not the emanation of a central authority owing a duty to the members. They constitute bargains driven between two or more parties dealing at arms' length and each seeking only to advance its particular interests.²

Political treaties, with minor exceptions, are not designed to provide a status of reasonable flux between the static and dynamic forces of the world. In the main they consecrate a

² There are of course certain treaties, chiefly commercial treaties, which reflect "antagonistic cooperation" and are mutually advantageous.

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specific act of taking by one nation away from another nation. When initially made they may reflect the existing balance of power between desires. More often, they merely reflect the fact that, at the moment, there *is* a preponderance of power in a certain nation or group of nations. A very small superiority of power can be and often is utilized, through "peace" treaties, to create a result quite disproportionate to the relative power of the parties. In any event, most political treaties do not seek to create a condition of elasticity, which will be adaptable to changes in the balance of power initially existing. Rather, such treaties tend to perpetuate the results obtainable from possession of an initial command of power.

Not only do most political treaties fail to create a condition of elasticity, but they themselves are not normally changeable except through force or the threat of force. Despite the existence of a vague doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*, political treaties are in the main of perpetual or indefinite duration, not subject to change to meet changes in the underlying conditions.

It is thus apparent that treaties largely lack those qualities which, within a national group, make laws an effective substitute for force.

Even so, it may be asked, do not treaties enjoy a certain sanctity such as do private contracts?

Certainly it is the fact that a sense of fidelity to one's word is one of the cardinal human virtues. It is a cornerstone of any well organized, peaceful society. It would be a hopeless task to create an organically sound social structure

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unless it could be assumed that the members, predominantly, felt morally bound to live up to their promises. This would equally be true of any society of nations. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that all group authorities step in to qualify the binding effect of the contracts of private parties. From a legal standpoint, private contracts have no sanctity or binding character except as an authority supplies it. The political authority has issued rules of the character and with the purpose we have described. Pursuant to these rules the group members are allowed by contract to effect certain results as between themselves. But the law limits very considerably the effectiveness and binding character of contracts. No legal rights are created and no legal duties are imposed in consequence of the mere fact that two people affix their names to a piece of writing called a "contract." Whether or not any results follow depends upon all the circumstances and whether these circumstances are such that the authority will grant rights to and impose duties upon the parties. The parties cannot do this by themselves. As said by Chief Justice Marshall, "What is the obligation of a contract? . . . The law binds him to perform his undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract."⁸

Without a subservience of contracts to public policy, it would be impossible to maintain the requisite balance within a state. Bargaining power is inherently of unequal distribution. If this inequality could be utilized without restraint, a condition of intolerable unbalance would quickly result.

⁸ *Sturges v. Crowninshield*, 17 Wheaton (U. S.) 122, 197.

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Those of mental, economic or physical weakness, must be protected to some extent against the consequences of their inferior bargaining ability, and this is so imperative that the group authority gives this consideration the right of way over that of fidelity to one's promise.

Space would not permit of listing the circumstances which lead the political authority to treat parties to a contract as not bound by any duty or entitled to any rights in consequence thereof. Certain illustrations may, however, be useful.

Contracts are invalid if one party has acted under the coercion of another.

Contracts are voidable if one of the parties through youth, or infirmity, is mentally incompetent to deal with his affairs.

Contracts are voidable if obtained by fraud or if the parties have assumed, as a basis for the contract, a state of facts which proves to be unreal.

Contracts of long and indefinite duration are looked upon askance and, in many cases, held invalid.

Contracts which involve overreaching by one of the parties, such as usurious contracts, are invalid.

There are very careful limits to, and restraints upon, the extent to which persons may be bound to their disadvantage by other persons purporting to act for them in a representative, trustee or agency capacity.

Overriding all contracts are certain rights of the state to subordinate them to the interests of the group as a whole. The political authority may prescribe a "public policy." If so, contracts are invalid to the extent that they run counter to such public policy. Contracts, valid when made, may become

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invalid as public policy subsequently changes. A further overriding right is that of the state to take, by eminent domain, for the public interest. Further, it may impress a public control upon property which serves a public need (*e.g.*, public utilities). Contract rights must be abandoned to the extent that they conflict with such public control. Above all is the right of the authority to take, by taxation, from those who have profited from contracts, and to utilize such taking for the benefit of the group as a whole. Individual "have-nots" are not allowed by direct and violent action to take from those who through superior wit or economic power can accumulate an undue proportion of worldly goods. But the State always stands ready, in such ways as are suggested, to scale down and distribute the rewards of successful contracting.

The foregoing illustrations are sufficient to show that group authorities recognize that while a sense of fidelity to contract is highly desirable as an individual characteristic, its operation must be qualified by the group authority if a flexible and fairly balanced social order is to be achieved.

Were we to test the treaty structure of the world by such principles as are commonly applied by group authorities, much of it would be without legal obligation. We do not need to go so far as to speculate upon the effect, upon treaties, of an overriding international public policy or of a right of international eminent domain exercised by a hypothetical international authority. Our point is sufficiently illustrated if we consider, as applicable to treaties, those positive rules which national authorities of most civilized

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communities apply to test the validity or invalidity of contracts. For example, a preponderant part of the political treaties of the world, at least a preponderant part in terms of significance, is represented by "peace" treaties which reflect the coercion of one group by another. A large additional part of the treaty structure of the world assumes a form determined by the menace, more or less implicit, of superior force possessed by one of the parties. Other treaties have a duration such that they have long out-lived the conditions which may originally have made them equitable. Many treaties reflect an excessive assumption of representative or delegated authority.

Treaties, of course, cannot be expected to have "obligation" in the sense that a government imparts the legal obligation to private contracts, for there exists no international authority to accord, or withhold, such obligation. Many treaties, however, obviously have characteristics which, when present in private contracts, lead the authority to deny them legal effectiveness. The combination of these two factors tends to undermine international morality. Within an organized group, the authority takes the responsibility of overriding private contracts, so that this can occur without abandonment, by the individual, of the principle of fidelity. When, however, there exists no authority, then treaty violation, even if justified, cuts across accepted standards of honor.

The popular idea of treaties as "law" and as "sacred" is understandable. Treaties, as we have mentioned, are gen-

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erally "law" within each national group. When a group authority makes a treaty with another group authority, each thereupon customarily enjoins upon their respective group members compliance therewith. Treaties are the "law of the land." From this internal standpoint treaties partake truly of the quality of law. The "sacred" conception perhaps has its origin in the fact that throughout centuries the heads of states arrogated to themselves the role also of divine authority, and in such public acts as treaties customarily invoked the divine authority. There was also a long period during which many treaties were made or sanctioned by the Pope. Thus it was made to appear as though treaties were the expression of some divine will.

There is, furthermore, as we have said, a deeply rooted conviction that fidelity to one's word is an attribute to be honored. This perhaps has its basis in expediency. So large a part of practical affairs can only be transacted on the basis of the pledged word that one with a reputation for unreliability in this respect is at a serious practical disadvantage. The quality of fidelity has also acquired a moral status.

There is no doubt that nations, as well as individuals, properly recognize the expediency of fidelity. Also, to a peculiar degree, this moral quality is attributed by a people to their own personified state, which they desire to be the embodiment of such primitive virtues.

Further, the concept of treaties as sacred law has always been cultivated by those nations which from time to time were, or hoped to become, the beneficiaries of an existing

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treaty system. Since most nations have at times been in this position, the influence of the conception has become widespread.

While we can thus find in historical genesis and in practical expediency an explanation of the popular belief in the "sacredness" of treaties, it is important that we should realize that no generalization in this respect is permissible. There are doubtless many treaties which under any international system would be accorded the sanction of authority. There are others which would not. In the absence of any central authority to pass judgment, one cannot consider treaties, as such, to be sacred, nor can we identify treaty observance, in the abstract, with "law and order."

If we do not realize that treaties, as such, are neither "law" nor "sacred," we will fall into the common error of thinking that treaties provide a mechanism whereby international peace can be assured. If treaties are "sacred law" why can we not at a single stroke abolish war by a multilateral treaty to this effect? That was the conception—and the error—which underlay the Pact of Paris. By it the governments of the world bound their nations forever to renounce force as an instrument of national policy. But neither the Pact of Paris nor any other international arrangement provided any peaceful mechanism for changing the existing order. Force or the threat of force remained, as it always had been, the only positive method of inducing change from conditions which, to some nations, might seem intolerable or unjust. Force remained the sole means of outlet to dynamic

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forces which, under existing or future conditions, might become repressed to the point of explosion.

If labor leaders were to purport to bind all labor for all time not to strike to secure improvement in conditions of labor, and if no other mechanism existed to secure redress, industrial peace would not thereby be assured nor would any validity or sanctity attach to their action. No labor leaders acting in a representative capacity would be deemed to have either the legal authority or the moral right to deprive those for whom they acted, including future generations, of their only means of bettering conditions which might become intolerable. No representatives could make effective delivery of such a renunciation. This is so even though it be admitted that strikes are a stupid, wasteful and dangerous method of settling labor disputes.

So it is with the Pact of Paris. So long as force is the only mechanism for assuring international changes then a purported renunciation of force is a nullity. Far from being "sacred" it would be iniquitous, even if it were practicable, thus to put shackles on the dynamic peoples and condemn them forever to acceptance of conditions which might become intolerable.

One notable attempt has, indeed, been made to alter the present unsatisfactory situation as regards treaties. This was by Article 19 of the Covenant of the League, which provides as follows:

"The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties

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which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

We here find the first attempt to realize an international organism having authority to pass upon treaties, to apply to each the test of furtherance of world peace, to direct attention to those which might from time to time fail to meet the test and to advise their reform.

The text is, to be sure, cautious and halting. The Assembly of the League can only "advise." It may be that nations affected can participate in the deliberations and obstruct the proposed action. No machinery is provided to implement the article. Nevertheless, there is here found for the first time in history the germ of an international group authority with power to give or withhold moral sanction in respect of treaties and under an injunction to exercise this authority in the general interest, with a view of preserving the world from international violence.

On the basis of this provision, feeble as it is, there might have been evolved some instrumentality other than force for effecting international change and affording a timely outlet to dynamic forces which, if repressed, are bound to become, first pathological, then violent. Such instrumentality could have given moral, if not legal, sanctity to part, at least, of the existing treaty structure. It could, by advising reconsideration, have withdrawn the appearance of moral sanction from that part of the treaty structure which was or became in-

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equitable or outmoded. Here, indeed, was the "heart" of the League, the genesis of an international authority responsible for the welfare of the whole, able to give to the treaty structure of the world that flexibility which is the indispensable complement to sanctity and the renunciation of force.

But it was a heart which never beat. This is understandable. The nations which had won the war and which dominated the League were primarily influenced by concern for their future safety. This was an inevitable and proper consequence of the fearful experience through which they had passed. Furthermore, France had for centuries been a battlefield for Europe. There resulted a tendency to action of an instinctive, rather than an intellectual, character. It is instinctive to seek peace and security in that which is rigid and which, because it is rigid, seems solid and dependable. It is only when intellect dominates emotion that we realize that it is flexibility and not rigidity which creates lasting stability. It was President Wilson and the American delegates who sought the incorporation into the League Covenant of Article 19. They were sufficiently remote to be able to perceive that treaty enforcement becomes an empty phrase without the counterpart of treaty revision. Their proposal was accepted by the Allies, but it was a formal acceptance without intellectual understanding. Thus when the United States itself failed to become a member of the League it was inevitable, certainly for the first few years, that those who had borne the full shock of the war and who feared desperately for the future, should cling to those provisions of the League Covenant which were primarily designed to preserve the existing

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order. Article 19 fell into oblivion. The League failed to use the processes of peaceful change with which it was endowed. It was left to force to effect changes more farreaching and more ominous than those which would have sufficed if freely and promptly accorded.

VI

THE PREREQUISITES TO TOTALITARIAN WAR

IT MAY be useful at this point to summarize the main conclusions to which we have come.

Man is by nature selfish. The association of human beings, while bringing certain advantages, places in juxtaposition the static and dynamic and enhances the possibility of struggle between them. The primitive method of resolving this struggle is force, actual or potential. To avoid the evil consequences attendant upon the use of force, and to obviate this destructive and wasteful mechanism, man has resorted to two alternative lines of solution. One is the ethical, whereby desires are spiritualized and selfishness in its crude form is transmuted into a sense of duty to fellow-man and the attaining of satisfaction by performance of that duty. The other solution is the political solution, the setting up by social groups of some arbiter who establishes rules of conduct designed to create a society wherein a fair balance is established between the static and dynamic, the latter being accorded an opportunity for peaceful achievement in a measure which is acceptable, while at the same time preserving a qualified satisfaction to those who prefer to maintain the existing

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status. We have further seen that the ethical solution is never fully effective and lacks that quality of universality which is peculiarly required in the international field. We also saw that, except for the abortive effort of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League, no attempt has been made to establish an international "authority" having the functions we describe.

The foregoing conclusions might at first glance seem sufficient in themselves to explain the occurrence of international wars. They are indeed adequate to explain certain types of wars. Such wars are those where the burden of their prosecution falls primarily upon those who hope to gain thereby, either materially or in terms of venturesome enjoyment. There have been such wars in the past and there are still parts of the world where wars of this type may recur. But these are relatively unimportant wars. They are wars that can be waged by professional armies without great risk or burden to the civilian population. They are like wars of preceding centuries and of the kind which permitted the war system to be tolerated.

The type of war which principally concerns us is wholly different. This is the "totalitarian" war, the prosecution of which requires the conscription of the entire population and its resources. It subjects all to great personal risk and suffering and to enormous material loss incident both to direct destruction and to the dislocation of all peacetime industries. It involves costs which for generations prevent the accumulation of large private capital. It involves a surrender of individual liberty.

The voluntary entry of a people into warfare of this

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character cannot be explained on the basis of our premise as to the essentially selfish character of human beings. Such a war is a supreme manifestation of emotional unselfishness and involves the dedication of life and property to what is believed to be a cause far transcending individual self-interest.

The selfish differences which arise between individuals of different nationality are relatively insignificant and are not wholly withdrawn from the application of the political solution. If, for example, an American and Canadian have differences, these may in part be ascribed to the lack of rules of conduct emanating from a common group authority. But though this may perhaps account for the conflict arising, it does not mean that solution of the difference is left to individual acts of violence. The Canadian and the American ordinarily have access to each other only within the jurisdiction of some polity, and its authorities will not permit of private violence. The dispute will have to be settled according to local laws, and while this may not be as satisfactory to all concerned as though the laws and the application thereof emanated from a common authority, nevertheless dissatisfaction on this score is small. There is, as a practical matter, surprisingly little genuine complaint on account of "denials of justice" in the settlement of private international disputes.

It is further to be noted that there is very little conflict between individuals of different nationalities. Only a small minority of any national group has personal acquaintance or dealings with any individual of another national group. In only a small percentage of these cases does conscious conflict

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or difference arise to a degree which would even suggest force as a solvent.

In contrast to this infinitesimal amount of genuine, conscious conflict, we have the fact that war involves the entire national group. How do we explain the fact that a group with virtual unanimity is willing to resort to force if only an infinitesimal percentage thereof have any personal conflict of desire with members of the group against which they employ force? How do we explain the fact that under such circumstances the overwhelming majority will cheerfully sacrifice all they hold most dear, well knowing that for most of them there can be no compensating gain?

When we put such questions we see that totalitarian warfare cannot be explained by our basic premise that human nature is essentially selfish. There is a vast gulf between such selfishness and the conduct which totalitarian war exemplifies. The discrepancy is so great as to require us to seek additional premises. Those which we have adduced are valid and need not be discarded. They account for some wars, and they are doubtless contributing factors to all wars. But they are in themselves grossly inadequate to account for that phenomenon, the totalitarian war, which it is our principal effort to understand.

Totalitarian wars are made possible by a series of circumstances of which the most significant is the essentially emotional quality of human beings. We like to think of ourselves as rational beings. We like to feel that reasoning and logical argument are the most persuasive means of inducing human

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action. Actually this is far from being the case. In only a small segment of our lives are our acts dictated by reason. In the main we act unthinkingly, under the impulse of emotional and physical desires or in accordance with tradition or the custom of the social group of which we happen to form a part.

If this is true of individual action, it is much more true of group action. Mob psychology is a well recognized phenomenon. It manifests itself not merely in lynchings and fire panics, but in the waves of optimism and pessimism which successively sweep through our business and financial world, and under the dictation of which we all act alike in doing what, in retrospect, appears incredibly stupid. Few phases of life are immune from the moulding influence of mass psychology.

Modern invention and scientific technique have tended to enlarge very greatly the ability to generate mass emotional waves. It has become possible to subject an entire people simultaneously to the impact of emotional appeal. Much has been learned as to the use of sound, color and form in arousing emotional reactions. Much has been learned as to the cumulative emotional intensities obtainable from the massing of human beings together.

There have in the past been times and conditions when human beings were sufficiently isolated to render difficult such simultaneous emotional impacts. Under such conditions slogans and emotional appeals still had their influence, for man's nature was as emotional then as it is now—perhaps more so. But conditions were such that it was necessary to

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depend more upon fact and reason. Sound reasoning and simple factual statements have permanency whereas emotionalism is transitory. When conditions are such that communication occurs by gradual transmission, ideas are more apt to be given a rational basis in the effort to prevent evaporation before the full desired effect is obtained. Emotional reactions may depend upon the turn of a phrase, the inflection of a voice, the timing of a pause. Effective emotional appeal is a work of art akin to the perfect rendition of music. The impression thereby created on auditors cannot, without loss, be transmitted by them to others. It is the performer, and he alone, who can secure the maximum result, and this by direct contact with those whom he would influence. Where this is not readily possible, some admixture of fact and reason is a useful aid to wide diffusion.

Scientific developments have created the radio, talking movies and loud-speakers. They have made it possible to have a widespread, simultaneous distribution of emotion-exciting pictures. Those who can avail of such devices and means of communication may effectively utilize purely emotional appeal.

Thus the same scientific progress which has converted war from expeditionary ventures into totalitarian conflicts, has also served to provide the new techniques necessary to excite the mass emotions which alone make possible this type of warfare.

We have pointed to the essentially emotional nature of human beings, particularly in the mass. Upon this foundation

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is built that form of patriotism which personifies the nation as a living being endowed with heroic qualities, who lives bravely and dangerously in a world of inferior, and even villainous, other-nation personalities.

The creation of this nation-hero personality meets a fundamental and natural human need. Most of us lead lives which are lacking in drama, excitement and adventure. We seek, through imagination, that which is lacking in reality. We read romances and see plays or movies which portray some hero or heroine in dramatic action, with whose exploits we tend to identify ourselves. This normal human trait has been capitalized to an extraordinary degree in the dramatization of the "nation-hero" and "nation-villain."

One's own nation-hero constitutes a personification with which each member of the national group can feel an identification and which has more elements of reality and permanence than the hero of novel or drama.

In order to build up the desired personification, history, in each nation, is written and taught in the manner of the dime novel. Emphasis is placed on dramatic episodes—war and adventure—which stir the imagination and arouse admiration and hero worship. In order to secure a maximum of emotional excitement, one or more other nations are cast in the role of "villains." One's own hero, always in the right, is in constant peril from such other nations. In the face of intrigue and peril the personified nation-hero comports himself with courage, forbearance and wisdom. Never a bully, he sponsors the cause of righteousness and of the oppressed; never bellicose, he has, nevertheless, a high sense

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of dignity and of personal honor which others affront at their peril. If he is forced to battle to defend his integrity or honor, to succor the oppressed, or to secure justice against wrongdoers, he conducts himself with bravery and honor. He usually emerges successfully from his hazardous adventures. If setbacks occur, which cannot be glossed over, they are portrayed as but temporary, like the incidents of a melodrama which, to sustain suspense, must admit of occasional failures that serve to spur on the hero to his final and more dramatic triumph.

This background, built up by history as commonly taught, is kept up to date by the current utterances of political leaders, and by the press. Throughout it all runs the theme of the nation as a living and heroic personality, always gloriously right but always menaced by the planning and plotting of other national personalities. And each of us is part of this hero.

The idolizing of the personified nation has been furthered by the real or imagined role played by the state as the Benefactor of the people. We have seen that one of the functions customarily assumed by "authority" is the devising of rules of conduct tending to enhance the productivity of the group to the end that their material desires may more readily be satisfied. Further, the authority is the instrumentality upon which the dynamic rely for freedom from repressions incident to the static desires of others. It is the agency whereby all are afforded protection against the violent tendencies of some. The state is thus the entity to which all turn

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at one time or another. This sense of dependence of a people upon their "authority" has greatly increased with the tendency toward economic totalitarianism and autarchy. As individual independence has waned, so there has waxed a sense of dependence on the state. Millions regard their "authority" as their benefactor and feel toward it a sense of deep obligation. To it allegiance should be given as the *quid pro quo* of past or expected benefits.¹

There are, of course, in each country those who do not feel that their obligation to their "authority" goes so far as to involve their blind allegiance. They believe that no personification creates any material things and that the bounties for which the government claims credit are in reality the product of the corporate or individual activities of the group. While recognizing that benefits flow from "authority"—else why this institution?—nevertheless it is man-made and man-administered and its apparent success flows primarily from the industry and resourcefulness of the governed rather than from any god-like qualities which the state itself possesses. The useful development of authority is, they believe, promoted if individual group members retain the faculty of independent judgment and if an "opposition" exists.

¹ The Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State (1937) found that: One of the three main positions on war which are sincerely and conscientiously held by Christians is, "while recognizing that political authority is frequently administered in a selfish and immoral way, they nevertheless believe that the state is the agent divinely appointed to preserve a nation from the detrimental effect of anarchic and criminal tendencies amongst its members, and to maintain its existence against the aggression of its neighbors. It is, therefore, a Christian's duty to obey the political authority as far as possible, and to refrain from anything that is apt to weaken it. This means that normally a Christian must take up arms for his country."

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There are also those who are not duped by the nation-hero, nation-villain, personifications. They are, perhaps, those who have had occasion to travel about the world and to become acquainted with those of other nationalities and races. Such experiences suggest that human nature is much the same throughout the world. Some peoples are differently situated from others, and consequently have different reactions. But if history is studied impartially it appears that similar circumstances tend to produce similar action, irrespective of race or nationality. We cannot explain foreign acts which we do not like by the simple expedient of saying that the foreign people is "possessed of a devil." Nor can we intelligently appraise any people as consistently righteous or having a monopoly of the virtues.

During times of tranquillity it is possible for a substantial minority to indulge in such detached and philosophical judgments. But it is different when excitement runs high and when there is a real need for impartiality and for judgment which is penetrating and calm. Then the individual judgment is usually overpowered by the almost irresistible influence of mass emotion—an irresistibility which may not be readily explicable but which cannot be denied as a fact.

If the nation-hero and nation-villain portrayals are readily accepted because they respond to a basic human craving, this is not to say that they are self-created or self-operating concepts. There must be those who set the stage and arrange the lines of the drama.

There have been times when responsibility in this respect

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could be attributed to business and financial interests which, from behind the scenes, were able to sway government and press. This has largely ceased to be the case. The evolution of government has, throughout the world, substantially impaired their influence. As the radio and similar devices permit politicians to appeal directly to the masses, they prefer to derive their power from this more malleable base.

The authors and stage-hands today are primarily those who compose the group authority. They lend themselves to this task of melodrama partly in good faith in order to create greater national unity and effectiveness and partly out of a desire, more or less conscious, thereby to enhance and perpetuate their own power.

We have noted that the duty of a group authority is deemed to relate only to its own group. If, therefore, it can obtain territorial, trade or economic advantages for its group it is supposed to do so irrespective of the effect upon others. The group authority realizes that ability to achieve this depends largely upon maintaining a high degree of national unity and patriotism. The mechanics for obtaining such advantages are, as we have seen, power politics. Advantageous contractual arrangements depend largely upon the possession of power. This is true of states as it is of individuals. The generation of power, the creation of a strong "national will," thus becomes, under our existing international system, an essential prerequisite to the achievement, in the international field, of the results which the group authority is under mandate to seek. This in turn calls for a high degree of national unity and patriotism. It is thus natural that the group author-

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ity should seek to maintain and intensify the nation-hero and nation-villain concepts and to accentuate in group members a sense of identification with and dependence upon their own-nation personification.

Such mentally honest justification is largely supplemented by self-serving considerations. The more critical the international situation is made to appear, the greater power will the group members give to their authority. The easiest and quickest cure of internal dissension is to portray danger from abroad. Thus group authorities find it convenient always to keep alive among the group members a feeling that their nation is in danger from one or another of the nation-villains with which it is surrounded.

In their efforts, the group authorities can count upon reinforcement from many private agencies which are engaged in catering to the emotional cravings of the masses. The financial success of such enterprises depends upon purveying shock and excitement. They are alert to pick up any suggestion of external danger or external villainy. By printed word or by pictures selected to produce an emotional reaction, they magnify incidents out of all relation to their actual importance and they induce unreliable generalizations.

Once nation personification has been achieved it provides the ideology which readily leads to mass sacrifice.

If man is normally selfish, he is equally capable of great sacrifice, particularly under the impulse of emotion and in aid of a "Cause." Religion has in the past often exemplified the strength of this human quality. The desire to die a mar-

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tyr's death has at times been so strong and widespread that it has even had to be restrained by the ecclesiastical authorities. "Holy" wars and crusades have, in part at least, drawn their support from the invocation of this spirit.

Within those nations which are dominant in world politics, religion today seldom demands of its followers that they lead a hard and dangerous life. Its ideals have become vague and uninspiring—except where there is an identification of the deity with the human group authority. Religion has, in the main, left it to the false gods of patriotism to evoke the self-sacrificial qualities in mankind. The personified nation has to a marked degree preempted the role of that higher spiritual entity with which every man desires to feel some identification. That this ideal personality should be defended and respected, and have a fair place in the world, constitutes a Cause which, under the stimulus of mass emotion, seems worthy of every sacrifice.

Thus it is that we make transition from the individual use of force, for individual aggrandizement or self-protection, to the mass use of force, at great personal sacrifice, to secure the aggrandizement or protection, or to defend the honor, of that mythical entity, the personified state.

Force thus plays its accustomed role as the solvent of differences and conflicting desires. But the desires are not those independently and spontaneously entertained by human beings for their own account. The desires are those which human beings impute to an entity which they have imagined. This entity is the object of their hero-worship; it is their supreme benefactor. To do its will and to achieve its desires

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becomes for them a supreme duty, and with this entity they feel an identification such that they vicariously share its satisfaction and triumphs.

That national personification has become general does not mean that identical characteristics are uniformly attributed to this personality. In the case of the individual, as he grows from youth to old age, there is a gradual change in the qualities of his ideal hero or heroine. This is equally true of peoples. They grow old or are rejuvenated. Their economic circumstances and attendant *mores* fluctuate, at times to promote zest for adventure and excursion, at times to desire maintenance and consolidation of the *status quo*. The characteristics attributed to the nation-hero vary with such changing viewpoints of those whose imagination creates it.

The nation-hero is built up by newspapers, magazines, pictures and oratory. His character is moulded by those who are experts at gauging and pleasing public opinion. Thus the nation-hero assumes a form which accords with what these experts think the people from time to time want, or will accept, as their ideal. A people who are vigorous, adventurous and unsatisfied, will see in their personified nation characteristics different from those attributed by a people which is satisfied, or whose dynamic energy is low.

Of the many possible variations there are certain types which particularly conduce to war. One is the crusading hero, who champions the cause of justice and succors the oppressed. Another is the ambitious, hard-working and deserving youth, who is repressed and prevented from realizing

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his potentialities by the greed, indifference or falsely assumed superiority of those who surround him. There is also the type of nation-hero who is sensitive of his personal honor and who is quick to strike out in case of actual or seeming affronts. Often we see qualities attributed which are characteristic of a persecution or inferiority complex and which evidence a feeling of being confined. In each case, however, a dynamic people is prerequisite to the imagining of a nation-hero who is prone to action.

Seldom, if ever, do we find the nation-hero endowed with unselfish and sacrificial qualities. The characteristics imputed are essentially those of the natural, primitive man, untouched by the influences we have called "ethical." This is doubtless due in part to the fact that, as we have noted, the group authority has no mandate to promote the general welfare. It is withdrawn from the operation of the ethical solution. At times, to be sure, the nation-hero is deemed to feel sentiments of chivalry—but principally when to act on those sentiments will involve an increase of prestige by bringing the weak or oppressed under his influence and away from that of another nation personality.

It does not, of course, follow that the nation-hero will be pushed into action merely because he is created by the imagination of people who are dynamic and ambitious or dissatisfied. There must usually be a possibility of successful action. Those in charge of a nation's foreign affairs are predominantly those who set the stage. They are sufficiently behind the scenes so as not themselves to be carried away

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by the emotions they would create in others. They are generally disinclined to permit emotions to force action which appears to them clearly to be suicidal. There are, of course, times when the group authority loses control of those emotional forces which it has called into being. But this is exceptional.

The foregoing considerations indicate that the entry of a people into a totalitarian war (other than as a strict matter of self-defense²) presupposes a conjunction of the following:

1. The people must be sufficiently organized as a nation to personify their state and to attribute to it the characteristics of a hero and benefactor.

(China, for instance, has for a long period not been nationally organized in the foregoing sense. The family has been the important social unit and the nation as such has had no hold on the popular imagination. When such a condition exists within an area, there is no danger of totalitarian war developing therefrom. There can be professional and bandit wars of the old, non-totalitarian type.)

2. The people must be sufficiently homogeneous to have come to substantial agreement as to the characteristics of their personified nation.

² "Self-defense" is a much abused term. Generally a clash of nation personalities is due to causes to which both peoples have contributed and for which both must accept responsibility (though perhaps in varying degrees). Occasionally, however, there is a case of pure self-defense. The hostilities between Belgium and Germany (1914) involved preponderantly considerations of self-defense on the part of Belgium and of expediency on the part of Germany.

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(At present there is no such unanimity in the United States. Some conceive the nation-hero as a shrewd and wise person who, having once been drawn into the quarrels of others, now knows enough to stay aloof. Others picture him as the defender of Democracy against the encroachments of Fascism and Communism. So long as these differences exist it is unlikely that the United States would enter into war, except for circumstances which would evoke other qualities which all agreed in attributing to the nation-hero, such as honor and dignity.)

3. The people must be sufficiently energetic and adventurous to endow their ideal personality with the qualities of a man of action.

(The energies of a people tend to rise and fall, as is illustrated by the rise and fall of empires and peoples throughout the ages. Generally speaking, advancing material standards, obtained without excessive physical effort, produce a demand for ease, self-satisfaction and self-indulgence and diminish the adventurous disposition. Need is apt to engender dynamic qualities, unless the need is so great as to lead to physical and nervous exhaustion. The dynamic *quantum* may be exhausted and drained off by a war and then rapidly replenished, as was the case with Germany following the World War.)

4. There must arise international circumstances which seem to call for action by the personified state if it is to be true to those ideals which the people in question have attributed to it.

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(In the case of no two peoples is the composite ideal identical. Accordingly, there are circumstances which, as affecting one nation, might seem to the people to require action and which, as affecting another nation, might seem to call for an attitude of superior disregard. A personified hero of vigor, honor and idealism—three qualities commonly attributed—would, however, normally tend to take action:

If he appears to be deliberately and repeatedly slighted or treated with disrespect or indignity.

If he, or those for whom he is responsible (his people), seem to be persistently denied reasonable equality of status and opportunity in the world.

If some Cause, which he has sponsored (democracy, fascism, communism or, in former days, some form of religion), appears to be jeopardized.

If the weak, toward whom he has assumed a protective or exploitive role, are threatened by some villain-nation.)

5. There must seem to be a reasonable chance of accomplishment by action.

(When a people is emotionally aroused its willingness to sacrifice has few limits. However, a group authority in its own interest usually avoids the creation of an atmosphere which would lead to suicidal action. In the case of Hungary, for example, there have for long been present most of the conditions indicated. But the fifth condition, a chance for action with some reasonable degree of success, has only now come to pass. There may be cases where emotion gets beyond the control of the group authority and forces it into a war without real chance of success. Here the emotion of the

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people is so intense as to give them a false sense of irresistibility.)

If we have correctly explained totalitarian warfare, our explanation is indicative of the completion of a cycle. The processes invoked to solve our original problem have operated to recreate it, in enlarged dimensions, but in identical terms. We began with small groups of associated individuals. Their members had conflicting desires. Force was the natural, primitive way of resolving these conflicts. The disadvantage of the force system was great. It led to efforts at solution. On the one hand, it was sought, as an "ethical" solution, to inculcate unselfishness and self-sacrifice, as a means of minimizing conflicting desires. On the other hand, a polity was established, with authorities to promulgate rules for the peaceful solution of such conflicting desires as survived despite the operation of the ethical solution. In this way it proved possible for groups to develop and expand under conditions of non-violence within themselves. But, finally, the two means of solution—authority and the will to sacrifice—have combined to recreate, as between the groups themselves, the problem which originally arose only as between the group members. The polities have been personified. To the domestic polity have been imputed qualities which, while heroic, involve primitive characteristics. To the alien polity there have been imputed evil characteristics and aggressive dispositions. Each political authority, as spokesman for the personified benefactor, the quasi-deity, of the group members, calls upon the group members to

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stand ready to sacrifice for the fulfillment of its desires, including that of resisting the presumed desire of others to despoil it. To this call they respond under the influence of mass emotion, for the creation of which an improved technique has been developed. Thus, in effect, we end where we began. We have reverted to a small group, this time composed of personified states—not of individuals. These imagined entities are endowed with sensitive honor and with the desire for aggrandizement, power and prestige—characteristics typical of the primitive man. These desires create conflicts which are no less real because they are largely imagined. The ethical solution does not operate to avoid them by transmuting into unselfishness the desires of these imaginary entities. Neither is there any international group authority to prescribe a regime whereby the conflicting desires can be peacefully resolved under conditions which fairly balance the conflicting claims of the dynamic and the static. Force, as exemplified by power politics, is the only solvent, and force is made available for the achievement of the desires of the state through the spirit of self-sacrifice which the individual group members place at the disposal of their respective political authorities.

VII

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WE HAVE now concluded our analysis of the problem of war. If our analysis is substantially correct, it should throw light on the failure of important efforts for peace. Many of them have had sufficient support to have been effective had they been soundly conceived. If, in fact, our analysis does explain such failures, this in turn tends to check the accuracy of the analysis itself. We shall from this viewpoint consider some of the more important peace efforts which have been attempted.

Education as to the horrors of war. This effort at solution has a dual aspect. On the one hand, it would align against war those who are fearful, for themselves or for those whom they cherish, and who are repelled at the thought of their suffering and violent death. On the other hand, it would create an emotional repulsion to war as an institution.

It is, of course, vitally important that there should be a wide diffusion of information as to the true character of war. The false glamour which so often attaches to war should be dispelled and its horrid nature should be popularly understood. This is a constantly recurring task, in the performance of which there can be no let-up. But we can scarcely expect peace to be secured by such methods alone.

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The appeal to self-conservation is ineffective as a mass influence because, as we have seen, war as it becomes totalitarian ceases to be a selfish pursuit. Such a war is predicated upon mass emotion whipped up to a sacrificial pitch. It is, of course, true that there is a stage, after war becomes a possibility and before emotion has full control, when the *degree* of personal sacrifice is a matter of significance. There is then a mental balancing of what must be sacrificed and the objective to be achieved. During such intermediate period a vivid popular perception of what war means, in terms of personal suffering, will operate as a deterrent. This was shown by the events of the last week of September, 1938. But such phases are usually of short duration. Mass emotion can quickly become so intense as to produce an affirmative desire—of exhibitionist character—to sacrifice. The greater the sacrifice, the greater is its attraction.

Aside from such considerations, peace efforts will strike a low and ineffective note if they involve primarily efforts to frighten. It is to man's credit that he may be willing to lay down his life for a cause. Also, there are many who seek excitement and risk to break the monotony of a hum-drum existence and who feel, with Ulysses: "Vile it were to store and hoard myself."

It is another matter to seek to create an emotional feeling against war as an institution. We should all hate that which is essentially cruel and which operates through the propagation of falsehood. But it is doubtful that any reliable prevention can be based upon such a feeling. The reason is that hate is an emotion, and emotions, at least mass emotions, are inherently unstable. It is hazardous to rely thereon unless

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one has control of the mechanics for arousing and directing emotion.

Such control is, however, largely in the hands of the group authority and of the popular press. We have already discussed their facilities for arousing mass emotion in the field of international affairs. Private persons and societies may at times have a certain influence on the emotions of the masses. But when critical times arise, control of mass emotion tends to pass into official hands. So influential can such control be that the best way to resist is *not to be emotional*. Some may entertain an emotional fervor against war which is so deep that it will prevail against counter emotions. But most of those who are emotionally inclined will be swept away by the intensity of the emotional waves which can be generated in favor of war. So long as there is peace, there are many pacifists. But when war threatens and the influence of propaganda is set to work their number is negligible. Therefore, we must not put our trust in peace efforts which primarily rely upon emotion. They accentuate that human quality which is the indispensable basis of totalitarian war.

Education to the fact that "war does not pay." It has been repeatedly demonstrated that war does not pay in terms of the material welfare of those who engage in it. As war has become more totalitarian in character, the demonstration becomes easier. Indeed, the proposition is self-evident. There is little need to legislate to "take the profit out of war." War has assumed a character which already largely assures this.

So clear is this, that totalitarian war is no longer presented in the guise of an enterprise profitable, in a material sense,

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to the generation which engages in it. War is represented as a sacrificial act. We have already seen how this cuts the ground from under those who would stop war by emphasizing the risks to persons which are inherent in it. In the same way, though perhaps to a lesser extent, the property argument is nullified.

We say "lesser extent" because people are often more concerned about the safety of their property than about the safety of their persons. To the extent, therefore, that people can be expected to rationalize about war, it is well that they should have an adequate factual knowledge. But, as we have just noted, there is apt to be only a brief period between the time when war threatens and the time when mass emotion dominates individual reason.

The argument of material self-interest is not merely ineffective. Its appeal is to characteristics which we should not seek to build up. There is already too much weighing of action exclusively in terms of its potential material benefits. War sweeps away sordid considerations of individual self-interest, whether personal or material. If there is anything commendable in war, it is that fact.

We cannot gain our goal by persuading people that self-interest is the primary consideration, in terms of which all else must be judged. This is the negation of the "ethical" solution.

It is true that the ethical solution has been perverted. We pointed out that the advent of totalitarian warfare marked the conclusion of a cycle. Self-sacrifice had been engendered to help solve the problem of individual violence. This and

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the political solution facilitated the development of human associations and the creation of national units which can maintain internal peace. But at this point the individual willingness to sacrifice was seized upon by the national authorities and utilized for the operation of the force system as between nations.

This suggests that solution may be found by destroying that individual willingness to sacrifice which the "ethical" solution has developed and the misuse of which has been made easy by facilities for arousing mass emotion. This is indeed the philosophical significance of such arguments as "war does not pay." It is easy to see how, as an evolutionary matter, we have come to this attempt to avoid war. But it cannot be accepted as a true solution. The history of mankind amply evidences that social peace largely depends upon the development of a spirit of self-sacrifice and of cooperation, even though it have competitive aspects. The ethical solution is an indispensable adjunct to the political solution. The fact that it is abused, and turned to an end which is violent, rather than pacific in character, calls for remedy. But the remedy is not to be found in deprecating unselfishness and extolling material or personal selfishness as the desirable standard of human conduct.

Isolation and Economic Internationalism. We have seen that national isolation is a solution which is logically suggested by the non-existence of any international group authority. It is the expression of an argument which runs as follows:

Human contacts involve dispute and conflicting desires.

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Force becomes the solvent unless there exists as a substitute some central authority to adjudicate the result. There is no such international authority. Therefore let us eliminate the international contacts as an alternative preferable to war.

A difficulty with this argument is that modern war may arise out of a type of contact which it is not practicable to avoid.

It is possible for certain peoples greatly to minimize their international dealings in the economic field. But it is difficult, and in the long run impossible, to isolate against ideas and against information, perhaps inaccurate and misleading, as to what is going on elsewhere in the world. We have seen that the precipitant of modern war is primarily ideology and that economic contacts are seldom its cause. On the contrary the refusal of certain nations to facilitate economic intercourse with others may take a form which will itself be a contributing cause of war because it gives rise to a sense of repression and confinement. There are some nations which possess such natural wealth and such intellectual and physical capacity to develop the manifold potentialities thereof, that it may be feasible for them largely to withdraw themselves from contact with the rest of the world. But a party wall, which is bearable and even pleasurable for those on one side may, to those on the other side, seem a prison wall. It is partly because certain dynamic peoples feel repressed within areas of inadequate economic opportunity that there grows up a sense of confinement—of claustrophobia—which leads to a desire for greater freedom—a so-called “place in the sun.”

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A great danger to world peace lies, as we have seen, in mass emotion developed along national lines to a pitch of abnormality. Such abnormality is promoted by isolation if the isolation is imposed from without. No individual can for long be isolated or shunned by his fellows without developing abnormal characteristics. It is the same with national groups. When they feel shunned or isolated, they tend to develop emotional reactions and attitudes which, from the standpoint of other nations, seem anti-social. They become abnormally sensitive and, as a reaction to a sense of inferiority, are apt to strike out against others who are weaker than themselves. Such consequence of isolation superficially seems to justify more isolation ("quarantining"). But thereby the gravity of the problem merely becomes accentuated. What we say relates not merely to economic isolation, but to isolation incident to an assumption by others of moral or social superiority.

If, however, imposed isolation promotes rather than prevents war, there are many so-called "isolationist" arguments which are sound as antidotes to an excessive internationalism. For example, international trade may be useful for peace to the extent that it reflects a normal, mutually desired and sustainable exchange of goods. But international trade is not, *per se*, a preventive of war. It may be artificially stimulated to a point where a reaction becomes inevitable which causes isolation more complete or more repressive than would otherwise have been the case. For example, the economic isolation of Germany which began about 1932 was consequent upon a break-down of the value of German

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money in terms of foreign exchange. This, in turn, was partially due to an excessive stimulation of German imports through credits extended and loans made in the period of 1925 to 1930. This illustrates that international trade, if it is made possible and can be sustained only by credit operations, is both unsound and dangerous. Credit may be usefully availed of for transitory purposes, or under conditions where the credit is self-liquidating. It may, with restraint, be used to develop raw material countries which can expect later to repay with the natural products which foreign capital opens to commerce. Even here experience shows that the credit operation often involves, from the national standpoint, a donation of goods and services. But as between highly developed countries, one-way trade cannot be perpetuated, and when it breaks down there ensue exchange difficulties which become the most absolute of all barriers. The debtor becomes unable to finance its current and normal import requirements. The people feel restrained and repressed and are driven to economic regimentation and autarchy. Nationalism thereby becomes exaggerated. On the side of the creditor, there are monetary claims which are not paid and for the collection of which normal debtor-creditor proceedings may not be available. These are for long a cause of irritation and a source of aspersions on the "other-nation" personality.

Furthermore, domestic necessities often are incompatible with international trade as exemplified by imports. When such obstacles exist, ill will is a consequence of obnoxious imports.

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Having regard for the way the world is now organized, a large measure of economic independence is desirable. It is hazardous that the economy of one country should become dependent upon the goods or markets of others so long as these others are likely at any time to cut off access thereto in the interest of their own economies. Continuity is a characteristic to be sought, and this is more important than an abrupt and impermanent rise in quantity. As between industrialized nations, the desirable objective is to permit each to procure the imports of food and raw materials reasonably required by its economy. To this end, it must be allowed to pay for its imports by furnishing services or making exports. These should be selected, so far as practicable, with a view to avoiding disturbance of the domestic economy of the recipient country. Over and above this, there may in certain cases be a mutually advantageous and moderate exchange of goods, on a parity of value. But the promotion of peace should not be identified with an artificial and unbalanced stimulation of trade, which may be temporarily profitable to those engaged therein, but which cannot be permanent and in the long run causes dislocations which irritate.

Restraint and balance in matters of international trade and credit are not "isolation"—they are the necessary preventive to isolation.

The Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg Pact). This we have already discussed in connection with consideration of the "sanctity" of treaties. We have seen that human beings are to a greater or lesser degree dynamic. Dynamic pressure rises and falls, and world changes are the inevitable counter-

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parts. Force, actual or potential, is a method for determining when and where and to what extent such changes shall occur. There can be no permanent renunciation of force until, by some alternative means, the world is made organically flexible and responsive to the constant fluctuation of underlying conditions.

The Pact of Paris would realize a desirable result without taking any of the steps essential to achieve it. What is first needed is some mechanism other than force which will serve evolutionary necessities. When, but only when, this is achieved will the Pact of Paris become an appropriate or practicable act.

League of Nations. The conception of the League is a noble one. It envisages, as between the nations, an organism comparable to such as have promoted peace in lesser spheres. Not only is the conception lofty, but the constitution, as embodied in the Covenant, is well conceived and susceptible of practical, constructive evolution. We have already commented on Article 19, authorizing the League Assembly to advise changes in international conditions when this is desirable in the interest of world peace. Here resided the germ of "peaceful change," without which violent change becomes inevitable. Here resided the possibility of a solution genuinely partaking of those characteristics which are typical of a successful polity.

However, those nations which dominated the League—the victors of the World War—conceived the League primarily as an instrumentality for perpetuating the *status quo*. Doubtless, like most satisfied persons, they genuinely mis-

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conceived the true nature of "peace." Furthermore, as we have noted, shock and fear tended to substitute instinct for reasoned judgment. Thus they conceived of peace as the avoidance of all change, the creation of a situation such that they would be left in tranquillity to enjoy their existing status. We have seen that in fact true "peace" means merely the avoidance of one particularly obnoxious *method* of change by facilitating a less obnoxious method—that "security" can be attained only at the price of insecurity.

In consequence of misconception in this respect, the entire weight of League authority was placed behind Articles 10 and 16, designed to prevent "aggression." No thought was given to setting up machinery to effect changes from time to time in those treaties and in those international conditions "whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world" (Article 19).

This was not because such danger was not perceptible. The Treaty of Versailles had been conceived in an atmosphere of emotion. Judgments had been warped by years of intensive propaganda, designed to achieve unity through intensification of a common hate. In consequence the Treaty inevitably embodied many injustices. Some provisions were in themselves unfair or intentionally repressive. Others were unjust in that they contravened the pre-armistice agreement, in reliance upon which Germany had laid down her arms. This was perceived by some even while the Peace Conference was still in session. It became apparent to almost all before many years had elapsed. It was also apparent that these inequities and injustices were operating to arouse reactions

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which not only "might," but surely "would," endanger the peace of the world.

Yet never did the League invoke Article 19 to change the conditions which were rapidly developing to endanger peace. This was largely due to the influence of France and her European allies, the recreated nations which derived their existence from the Treaty of Versailles. Owing as much as they did to the Treaty of Versailles, feeling dependent upon many of its terms for their future safety and even national existence, they instinctively sought refuge in the doctrine that treaties are, *per se*, sacred.

We all know many religious persons who sincerely believe in the literal truth of the King James version of the Bible. Intellectually, they realize that this text contains statements which cannot be reconciled with one another or with what they accept as scientific or historic truth. But they accept the whole as an act of faith. They feel that either all must be true, or none need be true. They do not permit reason to cast doubt on what is to them a source of vital, spiritual strength.

The French adopted much the same attitude toward the Treaty of Versailles. It must be accepted *in toto*. Once it were admitted that any part was subject to debate and change, then the authority would go out of it all. The way would be opened to general revision, and instability and insecurity would result.

The French doctrine prevailed and the League Covenant became, for all practical purposes, an alliance to perpetuate rigidly the post war status. "Sanctity of treaties" became the League slogan, and those seeking change were branded as

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potential "aggressors," against whom should be marshaled the economic and military power of other League members.

The United States, perhaps sensing the role which the League was destined to play, declined to become a member. As the need for change became cumulatively greater with the lapse of time, certain member states came to feel that for them the League was administered as a strait-jacket. Gradually there was a withdrawal of dissatisfied and dynamic powers.

Such limitations on the universality of League membership left the League in form that which the dominating powers had already made it in fact, namely, an alliance of the satisfied nations to maintain the *status quo*.

As the implications of this alliance became more apparent, England disengaged her foreign policy from the framework of the League. She perceived that the avoidance of war required a greater elasticity in world affairs than that permitted by the League as it had been administered by the member states. English policy reverted to its traditionally realistic character.

The League thus failed to become an instrument qualified to preserve peace. This is because it failed to conform to those principles which we have seen are indispensable if any polity is to substitute peaceful processes for those of violence.

We found that the political (or authoritarian) procedure involved an authority to establish rules of conduct framed in the interest of the group as a whole, and designed to provide ways other than force for assuring conditions which would be sufficiently elastic to compromise acceptably the

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conflicting dynamic and the static wishes of the group members.

The Covenant was sufficiently broad to have permitted the League to become such an "authority." The failure of the League is thus due not so much to structural defects as to the failure of the League members to utilize the instrumentalities which the Covenant put into their hands. Back of this lay a fundamental failure of public opinion to understand the true nature of peace.

*Non-recognition of the fruits of aggression.*¹ This program for achieving peace is essentially another variant of the doctrine that peace means a rigid and unchanging world structure. The underlying concept is the same as that of the Pact of Paris and of the League as practically operated. From the standpoint of so-called "sanctions," it is intermediate between these other two peace efforts. The Pact of Paris involved no sanctions and would achieve world stability by a self-denying ordinance, a voluntary renunciation of the only effective instrumentality for securing change against the wishes of the *status quo* powers. On the other hand, the League Covenant provides severe penalties. The "aggressor" is subject to economic sanctions and the possibility, also, of military force applied by the other member states.

"Non-recognition" involves a gentle penalty less onerous to those who would rebuke aggression, but by the same token less frightening to the "aggressor."

¹ Much effort of a high order has been devoted to securing agreement upon a definition of "aggression" which would be susceptible of practical application. The term has so far eluded such definition.

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Non-recognition by one state of a *de facto* situation created by another state involves certain practical inconveniences to both. The applicability of commercial treaties is thrown in doubt, the normal flow of trade and capital is interfered with. Consular and diplomatic relations are interrupted or continued only through ingenious and complicated subterfuges.

Only in rare cases does "non-recognition" operate as a serious deterrent to aggression. There are certain countries which are economically weak and which fall within the zone of influence of some major power. Upon this major power they may be largely dependent for capital and certain essential imports. Under such circumstances it would be a serious disadvantage for such a country to be in *de facto* control of territory where such control was not recognized by the major power to which it was economically subservient. In the main, however, non-recognition involves only mild pressure and, even admitting some possible influence as a deterrent, it would probably never operate to reverse an accomplished fact. Furthermore, it is not a policy which in the nature of things can be consistently and permanently applied. For a nation to base its relations with the outside world on the assumption that change brought about by force is in fact non-existent, is a policy of absurdity. A historical atlas of the world is startling in its showing of international changes which occur during the course of each century. So far such changes have occurred primarily through force, actual or implicit, and unless some alternative method of change is provided, or unless boundaries become less significant, such

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changes will continue to occur under the pressure of power politics. For any nation to close its eyes to such changes, and to treat them as non-existent, means the election of such nation to live in a world as unrelated to reality as that of "Alice in Wonderland."

The policy of non-recognition derives its principal appeal from the fact that it affords a degree of moral self-satisfaction. Aggression is always unpleasant and to be avoided. Its prevention is, as we have seen, a principal concern of mankind. In a society organized with an "authority" to eliminate recourse to force, physical aggression is both legally and morally wrong. In any such society, the victims of aggression generally receive and always deserve our sympathy. The aggressor receives our condemnation. Thus it appeals to our moral sense to have our government refrain from "recognizing" changes effected through the aggression of others.

Such an approach, however, involves carrying over into the international field judgments which derive from social units in which the authoritarian solution is operative. We can condemn the use of violence in a society which provides for peaceful evolution and change. We can deprecate it in any form of society. But we cannot, by analogy, indiscriminately carry forward moral judgments of aggression into a society within which neither political nor ethical solutions are operative.

Of course, the fact that the society of nations is unorganized does not afford a blanket license for wholesale aggression. Aggression may occur under conditions which are unwarranted and reprehensible. Individuals cannot be ex-

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pected to refrain from forming their judgments in the light of their impressions of the facts. Indeed, the development of an intelligent public opinion, as a moral force, is highly important. But "non-recognition" by governments, if we look upon it as a gesture of moral condemnation, is of dubious value. This is particularly so if the condemnation may appear to be tainted with hypocrisy, as, for example, is the case if the state which condemns is itself the beneficiary of its own past aggressions; or if it is a nation whose interests seem, at the time, to be preponderantly served by a maintenance of the *status quo*; or if from the standpoint of fundamental causation it must share responsibility for the creation of the conditions which bred the outbreak of aggression it condemns.

Non-recognition may at times be a useful measure whereby a nation may protect or advance its own interests, but non-recognition cannot be looked upon as a peace formula of general applicability. There are too few nations which have so controlled their own conduct that their officially expressed moral indignation rings true to others. Under these circumstances a policy of "non-recognition of the fruits of aggression" serves as an irritant rather than a pacificator.

There exists an impression that non-recognition is the only alternative to affirmative moral approbation which would be evidenced by recognition. There is no warrant for this impression. International practice over the centuries has made it clear that "recognition" merely constitutes taking cognizance of certain admitted facts. No moral judgment is involved.

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Armament. It is sometimes argued that large armament is the best peace policy. Of course, individual states may from time to time be so circumstanced that their particular peaceful future can best be assured by armament. With such individual cases we are not here concerned, for what we are considering is a world system designed to eliminate force as the mechanism of organic evolution.

It cannot be denied that the argument for armament has some plausibility. It reflects a point of view which was officially presented by certain nations at The Hague Peace Conferences. Such nations opposed efforts to eliminate certain methods of warfare on the ground that such elimination would promote war not peace. It was contended that the more "frightful" war would be, the less likelihood there was of its becoming a reality.

We have already considered the problem raised by the increasingly destructive character of war. We have seen that as war assumes this character, the prosecution of war shifts from an operation motivated by selfishness to an operation motivated by unselfishness. We have seen, given the emotional character of human beings and the technical devices available to arouse that emotion, that even totalitarian wars are possible. There is unquestionably force in the contention that war becomes less likely as its destructive consequences become more assured. Too short a time has so far elapsed since the development of totalitarian warfare to permit of any definite conclusions being drawn. Certainly it is a fact that several incidents since the World War, and notably the partition of Czechoslovakia, would have led to war had not

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armament become so great that the consequences of war operated as a strong deterrent.

It is, however, unsafe to place our hope of peace upon the terrifying influences of vast armament. The consequences of being wrong are too appalling. Furthermore, the achievement of such armament in itself requires the highly emotional state which is capable of precipitating a totalitarian war.

Armament on the modern scale involves great unproductive expenditure. Raw material and labor are required to be diverted from the production of consumer goods. No nation can arm on the scale now current without appreciably lowering the national standards of living. This in turn accentuates internal difficulties.

In order to bring a nation to support the burdens incident to maintaining great military establishments, it is necessary to create an emotional state akin to war psychology. There must be the portrayal of an external menace or of internal conditions rendered intolerable by the unjust restraints of foreign nations. This involves the development to a high degree of the nation-hero nation-villain ideology and the arousing of the population to a sense of the duty of sacrifice.

Thus the creation of vast armament in itself calls for a condition midway between war and peace. Mass emotion on a substantial scale is a prerequisite. The willingness to sacrifice must be engendered. A sense of peril from abroad must be cultivated. Once these conditions exist we have gone a long way on the path toward war. It is dangerous to rely upon reasoning as to consequence to restrain against the small

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additional transition necessary to the actual attainment of war. It is even dangerous, under such circumstances, to rely upon the ability of group authorities to prevent wars which they would avoid as lacking adequate possibilities of success. The forces they have heretofore set in motion in order to create armament, may compel its use.

The second theory of peace through armament is that advocated by the French after the World War. It involves arming, to a high degree, the satisfied nations which are interested in preserving the *status quo* and disarming the dissatisfied nations who would be disposed to seek change. It is reasoned that if the *status quo* nations can be adequately armed and the others can be adequately disarmed, then however much dissatisfaction exists it will be impotent to cause disturbances. There will have been destroyed that "reasonable chance of accomplishment by action" which we found to be one of the usual prerequisites to war. Thus the nations dismembered through the World War—Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey—were stripped of armament and permanently forbidden to rearm, whereas the nations which had gained from the Treaty, and were presumably satisfied, were left with huge military establishments, tied together by military alliances and understandings. As a sop to pacifist sentiment the disarmament of the defeated powers was described in the Treaty as a precursor to limitation of armament by the victors. But such representations were deliberately kept vague, so that the French thesis could be carried out without violation of any specific mandatory treaty clause.

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The difficulty with such a procedure is that, on the one hand, it is impossible to make any classification between the satisfied and the dissatisfied powers which will be permanently valid, and, on the other hand, it is impossible to assure that the satisfied powers will be willing to *use* force to perpetuate the inequality originally created.

Nations originally listed in the *status quo* group may quickly become restive. This has notably been the case with Italy. She was never happy with her treatment at the Peace Conference and with the allotments to her under the Treaty of Versailles. Her disaffection rapidly grew into strong discontent as the dynamic quality of the Italian peoples was raised under the leadership of Mussolini.

Such changes in national dynamics are potential in any situation. They prevent any permanent grouping of states as between those which are sufficiently satisfied to be, in theory, trusted with arms and those whose dissatisfaction disqualifies them from armament. Consequently the procedure we are discussing inherently involves the risk of allowing arms to a nation which subsequently may desire to change, rather than to perpetuate, the *status quo*.

Further, armament is of little significance if there does not exist the willingness to use it. The procedure which we are discussing implies that the disparity in force originally created shall be perpetuated. This in turn means that the armed nations must be alert to prevent, at its inception, any attempt of the disarmed nations to change their status. The armed nations, if they would through their armament preserve peace, must be prepared to wage "preventive wars" as

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promptly as any outlaw arming threatens. This in fact they are not willing to do. Such unwillingness is a psychological consequence of a state of satisfaction. As soon as any individual becomes satisfied he is disposed to enjoy what he has and becomes indisposed to arouse himself to exertion which will interfere with that enjoyment. This is a law of nature from which nations and peoples are not immune. The consequence is that the satisfied peoples, even though disposing initially of overwhelming superiority in armament, cannot in fact be relied upon to perpetuate this since this would involve their bestirring themselves to physical efforts which would impair that undisturbed enjoyment to which they feel entitled.

Disarmament. Limitation of armament is obviously the reverse of armament. If we are correct that the creation of vast military establishments is provocative of war, then limitation of armament is conducive to peace. However, it is highly doubtful that limitation of armament can serve as a *means* of obtaining peace. If limitation of armament comes, it will be a result rather than a cause of peace. So long as the force system prevails, then armament has a utility. So long as it has utility, so long will armament survive and the greater the utility, the greater will be the armament (subject to limitations of finance).

There have, to be sure, been arrangements for the limitation of armament. These, however, have not served primarily as a means to peace. Rather they have emerged when the armament in question was not likely to be used. The Five-Power Naval Pact was possible because war between the

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parties seemed unthinkable during the short life of the agreement. When this condition changed the limitation was abandoned. The naval agreement between England and Germany was possible because Germany then desired to avoid war with England—or at least did not seek decision on the sea. An agreed limitation of land armament has never proved practicable. This is partially because the technical problems are very complex. But a more fundamental difficulty is the fact that the nations having large land armament felt that such armament might be put to use. Consequently the negotiations involved an effort by one to obtain some military advantage over another and agreement proved impossible.

We do not under-estimate the importance of reversing present armament trends. Only thus can we avoid economic wastage and emotional aberrations which rival war itself in impairing our material and spiritual welfare. Vast military establishment may even, as we have noted, become a precipitating cause of war. But it would be a cause only in a secondary sense. Basically, the existence of the force system is the cause of armament and we cannot expect armament to be placed permanently on a non-competitive basis unless we first demote force from its role of supreme arbiter of change.

Sanctions. It is natural to turn to sanctions for a solution of our problem. The objective is to prevent the use of violence. Let us, therefore, organize a collective force, military or economic, to suppress that separate use of force which we would eradicate. Such procedure has the appeal which always attaches to direct action. It also has the support of analogy from the field of national groups. There it is cus-

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tomary to have a police force to prevent violence and to apprehend, for punishment, those who resort to violence. We are conscious that the existence of such public force serves as deterrent to individual acts of violence. Why should we not in the international field adopt a similar procedure?

The answer is doubtless that we should, but with important qualifications.

Within the state a police force exists, but it is effective only to control a tendency toward violence which may be manifested by a small minority of the group members. Laws depend for their enforcement primarily upon the force of public opinion. No police force can be organized which will serve permanently to control the disposition toward violence of a substantial part of the group. The reduction to small dimensions of those disposed to violence is effected by other means, and the achievement of this result is, as we have seen, a principal task of the group authority. It is charged with the duty of creating a form of society which will provide peaceful means for resolving those omnipresent clashes of desire which are primarily represented by those, on the one hand, who would retain and those, on the other hand, who would acquire—the static and the dynamic. While most human beings can be driven by circumstances to use force as the arbiter of their differences, there is a strong disinclination to do so. Resort to violence and killing is repugnant to most. It is because of this that society has invented the device of the group authority as arbiter. So long as a group authority measurably carries out its mandate the great bulk of the people will accept the alternative to force which is thus

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provided for it. Indeed, the indisposition to use violence is such that a considerable margin for error is available to the group authority. But there are times when the group authority grossly fails to perform its functions. It may, by virtual abdication, permit a condition of rigidity which plays into the hands of those who are sufficiently satisfied so that they do not want an elastic social order within which change can occur and their existing positions be impaired. When this happens, there develops from the left a revolutionary movement which ultimately gains such momentum that it cannot be restrained by any police force or by any threat of sanctions. On the other hand, the group authority may, in purpose or effect, so wholly ally itself with those who desire to overturn and despoil that there is not afforded a reasonable opportunity for enjoyment as a reward for those who engage in indispensable productive effort. If so, resistance occurs, with consequent violence and confusion, and there may even be a revolution from the right.

Thus a police force cannot serve and is not designed to serve as a substitute for the creation of a healthy balance between dynamic and static forces. A police force is effective only in conjunction with the attaining, otherwise, of such a balance. It can deal effectively only with marginal and usually abnormal elements which do not accept a form of society which is acceptable to the great mass as providing for a peaceful reconciliation of their normal desires.

We must in the international field look upon sanctions as adapted only to play a comparable role. They are not themselves a primary method of avoiding violence. This task is

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one to be achieved by the creation of a flexible and balanced form of world society. Until this is achieved it is premature to consider sanctions. When it is achieved, the role of sanctions will have shrunk to small dimensions and the problem of their form will be one of manageable proportions.

The premature development of sanctions has had definitely undesirable consequences. Most important is the fact that a procedure in itself meritorious has been discredited in many quarters by its improper use. Two other undesirable consequences seem worthy of note.

No people like to feel that their nation—personified as a hero—is subject to the coercion of others. In this respect nations are like individuals, who may accept coercion from an authority, as part of a balanced scheme of society, but who will bend every effort to be free of coercion by other individuals with whom they claim a status of equality.

To nations, the possibility of sanctions operates as a challenge to their independence. The immediate reaction is an effort to attain a status—military or economic—which will make them as immune as possible from coercion by sanctions. Thus the dynamic nations, feeling themselves to be the likely subject of sanctions by the *status quo* nations, are spurred on to build up their armament and attain economic self-sufficiency. They are unwilling that their internal economy should be so organized as to be dependent upon one or more other nations which are likely to apply sanctions. This explains such a fact as that Germany is relatively content to see prolonged the economic blockade which, when originally caused by the breakdown of her foreign exchange position,

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was regarded as a calamity. Now the economic independence thus forced upon her is welcomed as ending her vulnerability to economic sanctions. Other dynamic powers intensify their effort to control their own source of raw materials. Thus the potentiality of sanctions has tended to accentuate nationalism and the very policies which the sanction concept was designed to prevent.

In addition to the foregoing, it seems that the potentiality of sanctions is responsible, in some cases, for the tendency toward undeclared wars. Nations no longer feel bound to adhere to the classic procedure of "declaring" war. Hostilities, or the employment of force abroad, occur and may gradually expand in scope. Whether or not a "state of war" exists is left to individual judgments. There exists no formal criterion for fixing the moment when the external employment of force assumes the dignity of war. This tendency is dangerous. It permits subordinates, with local authority, to initiate a train of events having fateful consequences. There is lost a certain safeguard present when war involves a formal change of status which can be effected only by the solemn and deliberate decision of the highest authority. There are doubtless other causes operating to produce this trend toward undeclared wars. But one explanation is certainly the fact that this procedure renders awkward the invocation of sanctions, or of "neutrality" measures which have a similar effect. Neutral states, as a matter of friendliness or of domestic expediency, may close their eyes to operations which to others seem clearly to evidence a state of war.

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The possibility of cooperative neutral action is thus minimized.

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The foregoing review permits of a generalization. Most peace efforts have only ephemeral results because they are limited to striking directly at an undesired manifestation. There is a failure to deal with causes which, if unaltered, inevitably produce that which we would avoid.

VIII

INTRODUCTION TO APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF SOLUTION

IT IS not to be expected that at this point there can be produced some novel formula of easy application. There is indeed a strong presumption against the validity of any solution which seems novel, or quick and easy. As we have pointed out, the elimination of war represents merely a phase of the age-long struggle of mankind to eliminate force as a solvent of conflicting desires. Through the processes of trial and error we have slowly made progress over the centuries. If we are intelligent we can continue to make progress. But we must be content with slow progress and even this requires that intelligence rather than emotion should be our guide. We must seek to detect the essential principles running through those efforts which have resulted in past progress and to apply those same principles to the factors which now operate to cause war.

We have, over the past, sufficiently evolved from the force system, so that the procedure has assumed well-defined lines. It involves the application of the two principles which we have called the "ethical" and "political." The one operates on the spirit—it is sought that desires be spiritualized and

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harmonized. The other operates on conduct—society is organized into a “polity,” a “commonwealth,” with government charged with creating conditions which will strike a fair balance between conflicting dynamic and static desires and provide methods other than force for determining which shall be fulfilled. As an adjunct to this latter way of solution, we find that sanctions are provided to control that marginal element which, through special circumstances, may be indisposed to accept the prescribed substitutes for force. We further saw that, in the case of both the ethical and authoritarian lines of solution, there were factors which had so far prevented their effective application to the international field. We subsequently sought to analyze the nature and present causes of totalitarian warfare. We then saw that efforts for peace, as they have taken form since the World War, fail to cope with the problem as our analysis showed it to be. It is now in order to consider how the ethical and authoritarian solutions can be pushed forward into the international field so as to bring the influence thereof to bear on the particular factors which our analysis showed to be conducive to totalitarian warfare.¹

We saw that the totalitarian warfare involves submergence, in the state, of the will and desires of the individual, and that this is rendered possible only by that extreme

¹ Political events in each nation constantly require those who seek peace to take positions on specific issues. We do not attempt to deal with these. To do so would be beyond the scope of this study. We are seeking to deal with fundamental factors which produce the war system and to develop the broad principles of solution. Current preventive activity should be consonant with these. Our silence on day-to-day issues does not mean that we do not consider them important.

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personification of the state which has developed so markedly during the past century.² The world is thus in imagination peopled with some sixty super-beings. These imagined beings are endowed with primitive and conflicting desires. There as yet exists no "authority" to provide, as between such desires, other solvents than that of might. The "ethical" solution also fails to operate because group authorities are not deemed to be subject thereto or to have any duty to each other. The personified states are not endowed with the spirit of sacrifice and renunciation. The "ethical" principle operates, to be sure, upon the individual group members, and creates a willingness on their part to sacrifice for others. But the "others" tend more and more to become the personified states to the exclusion of more universal causes.

It is into this situation that we must seek to project the ethical and political solutions. There are, of course, many possible points of approach. No one should be categorical in affirming that any particular procedures have exclusive title to either theoretical soundness or practical expediency. Furthermore, here as elsewhere, the principle of change is operative and must be taken into account. The nature of war and the conditions indispensable to its occurrence are in constant flux. We saw, for example, that the nature of our problem changed with the change of war from expeditionary ventures of the few to totalitarian operations. There are today further signs of transition, both in the form assumed by force to effect change in the international field, and in the ideology with which such use of force is cloaked. We find

² There were doubtless comparable personifications during certain periods of Roman and Grecian history.

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a tendency to employ force externally without the formality of a "declared" war. There are doubtless various causes for this. Sometimes the controlling consideration may be the potentiality of sanctions, to which we have alluded. In other cases, the cause may be primarily a desire to avoid that full employment of the national power which is incident to modern warfare. Formal war involves national prestige to the highest degree. Any formal war must be prosecuted with the greatest vigor in the hope of achieving a quick and complete victory. But this involves a use of man power and of economic resources on so vast a scale that the cost becomes a serious deterrent. An external use of force, without the declaration of war, may be moderate and avoid the terrific economic dislocation incident to a war in which the nation's maximum effort must be employed.

Coupled with the trend toward "undeclared wars" is the development of a new ideology based upon different philosophies of government. We have large groups of people who feel an emotional loyalty to communism or fascism or democracy. The terms, as popularly used, are largely catch phrases, having but vague intellectual content. But they serve as slogans useful for the arousing of mass emotion.

This new ideology—coupled with undeclared war—provides a new technique whereby the dynamic nations effect changes in the *status quo*. Through ideology, national boundary lines are first peacefully penetrated.³ This is not difficult when the penetrating ideology is communism or

³ We refer to such ideological penetration as a "new" development. This is, of course, only relatively so. A century and a half ago the new conception of "democracy" operated to effect vast international changes.

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fascism. The governmental systems so labeled are new and vivid and embraced by millions with a religious fervor which is contagious. Also, there are many areas of the world which are fertile fields for any system of government which involves change from that which exists. Through such ideological penetration the way is opened to effect change without the formal declaration of war. The change may, indeed, be of a character which, nominally, leaves national boundaries intact, but which in substance gives greater scope of opportunity to the dynamic forces within a nation which demand an outlet. The foregoing trend may evidence the beginning of a new era, akin to that of the religious wars, when force will be employed internationally without formal declaration of war and under the banner of governmental philosophies.

So far, the ideologies of fascism, communism and democracy do not appreciably transcend nationalism. Rather, they are adjuncts to nationalism, representing Causes which the nation-hero espouses and which nation-villains oppose. Even were the trend to become much more marked, it would not invalidate the principal conclusions to which we come. But it would require a certain adaptation of their application.

Recognizing the inevitably qualified and tentative character of any conclusions, we proceed to consider measures which practically may operate to minimize the use of force to effect change in the international field.

1. From the standpoint of the ethical approach, our diagnosis of the problem suggests the following as practical lines of procedure:

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The ethical solution is largely inoperative because the principal actors in international affairs are personified states not themselves endowed with sacrificial qualities. Further, they prevent the sacrificial dispositions of group members from operating in the international field by attaching them to the ideology of nation-conflicts.

The personified states are creatures of the imagination. Their roles and their desires are, of course, imagined. Can we not give greater scope to the ethical solution by (a) preventing the imagining of national desires that conflict, (b) diluting the exaggerated role of hero, benefactor and quasi-deity, accorded to these personified beings who lack the quality of unselfishness?

2. We cannot expect quickly to dilute and change the role of personified states. So long as they exist, their prestige and the extent of their national domains are matters of moment and must be subject to the interplay of static and dynamic desires. As an approach toward the "political" solution, can we not make a beginning by setting up international bodies having some at least of those characteristics which we noted as being essential to an effective "authority" and which would promote greater elasticity in national relations conducive to an acceptable balance between the dynamic and static desires of the personified states?

We will take up these points in order.

IX

APPLICATION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION

SINCE the personified state is a creature of the imagination it would appear that international conflict could easily be avoided by endowing these imagined beings with characteristics such that no conflicts of desire would arise. This is true only in theory. Such an attainment would represent a triumph of the "ethical" solution far more complete than any which has yet been achieved. In our review of the efforts made by human beings to eradicate force as a solvent of their conflicting desires, we saw that considerable progress was made as a result of the development of the ethical solution, and that to an extent human desires had been moulded so as to minimize the conflicts between them. We saw that to this mankind could ascribe much of the social peace which it has from time to time enjoyed. But we also saw that the ethical solution in its pure form makes but slow and gradual progress, and that human desires cannot, within a predictable period, be so spiritualized as, through this way alone, to solve our problem by eliminating conflicting desires.

We must recognize the existence of even greater limitations when it comes to the characteristics of personified states.

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The personified states cannot be more spiritual than a composite of the spiritual levels of the human beings whose imaginations create them. Over and above this limiting factor we have the further one which flows from the fact that artificial entities (bodies corporate and public authorities), for reasons not without weight, have historically been deemed withdrawn from the operation of the ethical solution in its pure form and are presumed to have a duty only to the members of the group which creates them.

Having regard to the foregoing limitations, we must recognize that the qualities attributed by a people to their own state are reasonably lofty. The personified nation is endowed with qualities deemed to be virtuous and heroic. We have not, as individuals, reached a point where self-abnegation and non-resistance are qualities which are imputed by those seeking to create a heroic image. This is hardly to be expected. Even so, the imagined state has attributed to it characteristics which are creditable. If such characteristics typically include a high degree of pride and ambition to enlarge its domain, there are also included characteristics of fidelity and chivalry and desire for peace with honor.

There is doubtless room for progress with respect to the qualities which peoples thus attribute to their own personified state. Efforts to this end should not be abated. But the early progress which we can expect to make in this respect is not great. Fortunately there is another respect in which it is reasonable to believe that substantial progress might be made.

Conflicts of desire between personified states are at-

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tributable, not so much to the desires imputed to one's own state as to the desires imputed to other states. The latter are of such a character as to be calculated to provoke even a saint-like person. It is in this respect that the greatest possibility of practical improvement lies. We have seen that if one's own nation is visualized as a hero and endowed with qualities which are in many respects admirable, there is equally a tendency to visualize other-nation personalities as villains who are cruel, scheming and either aggressive (if the other-nation is in the dynamic group) or callously selfish and possessive (if the other-nation is in the static group). It is, however, significant and encouraging that aggressiveness in international affairs has come to be regarded as a quality so undesirable that it is seldom imputed to one's own nation-hero. It is the other-nation which is the "aggressor." For example, the Japanese people do not currently conceive of their nation as being an aggressor against China. To them the roles, in this respect, are reversed, China being the aggressor. If we find it difficult to accept this viewpoint as sincere, we may read a current brochure for tourists which describes England's seizure of Hongkong in 1839 in the following terms:

" . . . all British shipping and traders from Canton and Macao proceeded to Hong Kong where, hoisting the Union Jack, they prepared to resist aggression."

It reflects much progress that aggressiveness is no longer deemed to be a quality to be imputed to one's idealized nation. But the progress thus gained is largely nullified when

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aggressiveness is freely attributed to other-nation personalities. For if we have come to deprecate aggressiveness we have not yet reached a point where we are prepared to admire submission to aggression.

We have seen that the nation-hero personification is in large part a response to the romantic nature of human beings. But romance asks not only for a hero but for a villain. In order, therefore, that human nature may have the type of stimulation which it desires, we tend to imagine other states as villains. The villain portrayal is embedded in recorded history, it is kept up to date by the press, and, as we have seen, it is actively promoted by the several group authorities which thereby have their hands strengthened in their dealing with other nations, and secure greater unanimity of domestic support.

If there is practically room for but little progress in elevating the desires attributed to our own nation-hero, there is room for much progress in imputing less ignoble desires to other-nation personalities. Human nature has advanced to a point which would seem to make this progress practically realizable. We have evidence of this in the evolution of religious conceptions. For a long time religion was vital only as God was deemed to be in conflict with a Devil. A Devil-personification was the inevitable counterpart of a vital God conception. This has now largely changed. There are many who believe in God without believing in a Devil with whom God is in constant struggle. It may be that this evolution partially accounts for a certain lack of religious vitality. It may be that the nation-hero versus nation-villain concept is

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in part a substitute for, and attributable to the decline of, the God versus Devil concept. But even allowing for this, we have seen it demonstrated that it is possible for millions of persons to believe in a God without the stimulus of Devil belief. They should equally be able to believe in a nation-hero without the nation-villain concept being a necessary concomitant.

If this be so, then we have a situation which is controllable and where real progress can be made. For the nation-villain concept is preponderantly fictitious. The facts rarely warrant it. All peoples, whether static or dynamic, at times act in ways which are reprehensible. There are occasional manifestations so repellent as inevitably to arouse our moral indignation. But the reason is usually to be found in conditions for which responsibility must be shared. Just as society is responsible for its own criminals, so the nations are jointly responsible for conditions which at times breed abnormalities. The occurrence of abnormal and anti-social action within certain national groups does not justify the "other-nation-villain" concept. It merely confirms that which we would expect, namely, that world society is not so perfectly organized as to prevent the occurrence, within the society, of peoples warped by conditions.

There are, of course, inevitable variations in the characteristics attributed by peoples to their nation-hero. These, as we have observed, depend largely upon the degree to which the people are static or dynamic and under a sense of repression. But the characteristics are essentially the same and almost uniformly include, as we have noted, a negation of

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aggressiveness, on the one hand, and of callous selfishness, on the other hand.

When, therefore, we impute to an other-nation personality the characteristics of a "villain," we are imputing characteristics which the other peoples do not themselves impute to their personified nation. We could eliminate much of the apparent conflicts of desire between nations if we could see the other-nations as they are conceived by the other-peoples themselves, and in the light of their factual background. If one goes into one of the foreign countries that is popularly regarded as playing the "villain" role, and if one has an open and inquiring mind and facility for observation, one is deeply impressed by the difference between the picture thus obtained from within and that portrayed without.

The other-peoples conception of their state is readily ascertainable, but it is practically never made available. This is due in part to the background of history, which, as we have noted, is written and taught in terms of the melodrama of nation-hero versus nation-villain. Superimposed upon this is the contemporary portrayal by the press and radio of foreign news, which is selected largely to fit into and accentuate some preconceived nation-villain concept. There are occasional bits of detached and impartial reporting. Certainly, the preference of most foreign correspondents would be to transmit a picture which is accurate and balanced. But this is of small influence compared with the public demand for melodramatic episodes. There is a powerful pressure to cater to the public desire to be shocked by the misconduct of others. Above all, the group authority constantly makes thinly veiled

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allusion to the misdeeds of other nations and assumes, in respect of such nations, an attitude of moral superiority.

We can, therefore, come to these conclusions: The conflicts of desire between nation-personalities are largely fictitious. They primarily derive from one people imputing to some other-nation villainous qualities quite different from those imputed by the other-people themselves and seldom warranted by the facts. The Devil concept, while responsive to primitive human desires, is not absolutely demanded, as evidenced by its being discarded in the religious field. The Devil concept would be much less potent in the field of international relations: a) were history written and taught on a factual and impartial, rather than a dramatic and partial, basis; b) were the press to seek to report the actual viewpoint of foreign peoples rather than episodes calculated to confirm some preconceived "villain" role; and c) were our group authorities to refrain from suggesting the moral inferiority of others.

Achievement along the foregoing lines is obviously difficult. Historical conceptions are largely crystallized, and can only slowly be made over. The secular press, if privately owned, is necessarily influenced by financial considerations. It will be long before human nature is so changed that the public will prefer to buy newspapers which recount good rather than evil, or those which are calming rather than exciting. The sensationalism of the press has in some countries been a reason or excuse for rigid state control or censorship. While this may correct certain faults, it opens the way to more serious dangers. For the group authority has its own

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ends to serve and is peculiarly prone to cultivate the nation-hero versus nation-villain ideology.

But we need not feel impotent in the face of such difficulties. They can be surmounted, at least to an extent sufficient to mitigate greatly the risk of war. For example, in most countries there exist powerful and well organized groups devoted to the cause of international peace. They can and do influence public opinion independently of the press and public authority. Unfortunately such groups are today largely dominated by the other-nation-villain concept. They feel that certain nations are "possessed of a devil," and that it is their evil dispositions which endanger peace. If such groups came to realize that it is precisely these conceptions which make war possible and probable, then they could do much to prevent public opinion assuming such war-provoking form.

It will doubtless be felt by many that abandonment of the nation-villain conception would involve the condoning of actions which are repellent. It is felt that considerations of morality require the expression of indignation.

It is of the utmost importance that there should be a world opinion sensitive to injustice and inhumanity. There may be times when it should be vocal, although the expression of indignation rarely produces the desired results. Opinion which most effectively influences conduct is generally silent, and is made known by example rather than by declamation. If, however, vocal expression is called for, it need never assume the form of the indictment of an entire people or of a nation. Furthermore, there are never occasions when the condemnation should be isolated from a sympathetic

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study of the real facts and of the causes of that which we condemn. There are only rarely occasions when those who condemn should not couple their condemnation with repentance, in word and deed, for the causative part played by their own nation.

If religious and peace organizations would come to a realization of these facts, they could prevent the unthinking acceptance within one state of the devil characterization of another. Apparent conflicts between personified nations would be reduced from their present fictitious and exaggerated basis. If so, they would prove to be much less dangerous and more amenable to peaceful handling. We would have greatly reduced the possibilities of arousing that type of mass emotion which is requisite for totalitarian warfare.

Our second effort would be to subordinate and dilute the personification of one's own nation. The objective is a dual one: first, we would decrease the role played by a personified entity not itself endowed with sacrificial qualities. Further, we would expect that thereby the unselfishness and willingness to sacrifice of individuals might operate more freely in the international field. This quality of unselfishness is, as we have seen, the principal ingredient of the ethical solution, but it fails to promote that solution in the international field if a personified entity, itself selfish and non-universal, is first promoted to a primary status, and then disposes of the sacrificial qualities of others for its own particular ends.

That the personified nation has achieved its present exalted role is due to the concurrence of two causes. With the

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decline of religion as a vital influence, the state has stepped in to fill the role which the mass of mankind generally demands shall be filled, namely, an incorporeal being endowed with perpetuity and possessed of qualities which seem noble and heroic. Secondly, with the practice of extreme nationalism, the state assumes, in popular imagination, the role of the benefactor and protector through which alone can security and adequate economic opportunity be assured.

There is room for dilution of both the concept of the nation-deity and the concept of the nation-benefactor. The two will be separately considered for, while they are often confounded in result, they are theoretically dissimilar in origin. The nation-benefactor concept is primarily consequent upon considerations of material expediency. The nation-deity concept is responsive primarily to the yearning of human beings for identification with some spiritually superior entity.

In our consideration of the basic problem we said: "Aware of his own finite character, and his inadequacies, man seeks self-exaltation by identification with some external Cause or Being which appears more noble and more enduring than is he himself." Also we saw that, though man is essentially selfish, this selfishness does not continuously assume the form of crude materialism. Man, at least sporadically, welcomes identification with a cause which demands sacrifice.

The nature of the ideal, the objects of sacrifice, vary from time to time. There have been times when religious concepts dominated human emotion and the action that springs there-

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from. This has primarily been at times when such concepts involved the dramatic contrasting of God and Devil, of Heaven and Hell, of Believer and Infidel. But such ideology, doubtless beneficent at its inception, became exaggerated to a degree that led to widespread destruction and suffering, as during the period of the religious wars. A reaction and dilution occurred. But such dilution involved religion becoming more universal and abstract. When this occurred, religion became less gripping and vital. It became inadequate to satisfy the mass need of a clear-cut, vivid object of adoration and sacrifice.

At this point the gods of nationalism were imagined to fill the want which most men feel. Doubtless this ideology in turn has served a useful role. Under its influence there has been a marked increase of the quantum of material things available for human needs. But here, again, an ideological cycle has been completed. The nation personifications have become so extreme as to be a cause of widespread destruction. Their dilution is now imperatively demanded.

It may be that dilution will be effected only by some final phase of destruction such as now threatens. But this need not be the case. Other means exist.

We can, of course, scarcely expect those in authority to discourage the blind loyalty and sacrificial devotion of the group members. Neither can we expect the masses, as a matter of independent judgment, to abandon that form of ideal which the group authority presents to them and which fills a need not otherwise provided for. We can, however, regret that there is a present failure to render real and satisfying

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those ideals which are far more suited to present needs than those now represented by the human authority. We can believe that such failure need not be permanent.

Devotion to an ideal and willingness to sacrifice therefor are among the finest of human traits. Also, they are among the most dangerous. It is indispensable to our well-being that they be invoked only in a truly worthy cause. It has now become indispensable to international peace that they be inculcated on a basis which transcends that of nationality. Such broad causes have been revealed and can again become vital. They can absorb that willingness to sacrifice which demands an outlet. Only if this occurs can we expect the personified state to shrink to a diminished role in human imagination. Only if this occurs can we release spiritual forces into a sphere of greater universality.

Christ taught that we should render unto God that which is God's. We have been rendering unto Caesar that which is God's. The finest qualities of human nature are at once too delicate and too powerful to be put blindly at the disposal of other humans who are primarily concerned with their own kingdom—not the bringing into being of the Kingdom of God.

The human authority has a mandate to promote only the welfare of the members of its group. This mandate could be more broadly interpreted. Particularly a longer range view could usefully be taken. But the mandate cannot practically or usefully be broadened to include other peoples. There are valid reasons why a group authority should be

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deemed charged with a responsibility primarily to its own group members. In our present stage of development it is best that each should have its own clearly defined field of action. Promiscuous and haphazard efforts by one group authority to do good outside of its own jurisdiction are apt to end as mischievous meddling. It is a sound principle of international practice which bids each nation avoid interference with the internal affairs of another. But so long as the group authority is charged only with the group welfare, then it should not be deified. It has become increasingly deified throughout the world largely because religion has left a vacuum which the group authority is eager, and apparently able, to fill.

This deification of the nation which has developed so dangerously can be overcome by some form of spiritual revival which will alter and broaden the concept of what is worthy of devotion and sacrifice. Concededly it is a difficult task to secure devotion to that which is abstract and universal. The concept of a duty to fellow-man, without regard to propinquity, or to race, creed or nationality, is so pure as to lack ready appeal. Even so, there are many who could derive satisfaction out of association together to promote the welfare of the human race. This is, indeed, on some interpretations, the objective of Christianity. For those whose need is an ideal more concrete and specific, there exist many less dangerous than those now represented by the deified state. Social philosophies, such as communism, capitalism, fascism or democracy, already are becoming idealized to

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many and are recipients of their devotion and sacrifice. If such idealizations were divorced from nation personifications, and if force were renounced as a means of propagation, they might provide a new ideological phase which, with all its dangers, would be an acceptable alternative to the clash of nations which confronts us. There is ample evidence that religious concepts remain potentially inspiring and able to create a spiritual unity which overrides national boundaries. Charitable, philanthropic and educational causes exist in large number.

Even had we clear convictions, it would be out of place here to propose any specific "cause" as that best qualified to displace, in popular imagination, the present extreme idealization of the nation. It is sufficient to know that many such potential causes exist, and to point out that their great opportunity is now here. It is inevitable that there be a large releasing of those emotional loyalties which, over a span of years, have been so exclusively dedicated to the state. This will perhaps occur only after it has been further demonstrated that mass sacrifice for the nation-god is productive, not of good, but of evil. But this conclusion is accepted by so many that the opportunity for change is already here. Millions long for the vision of a new ideal which will energize their spiritual and emotional lives, and constitute a worthy object of sacrifice. If this opportunity be availed of, if this want can be filled, the state will recede as the entity which dominates the spiritual, or romantic, life of its people and, so far as international affairs are concerned, almost ex-

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clusively disposes of the mass emotional sacrifices of which they are capable.

The loyalty of an individual to a being whom he idealizes is generally mixed as to causation. In part it may be an expression of admiration and regard for one who is deemed to possess noble qualities. But it is apt, also, to reflect gratitude for past benefits and an expectation of benefits to be received. This is true of the usual attitude toward a deity. Even more so is this true of the attitude toward the personified state.

The individual looks to his group authority to assure him and his fellows security against violence and to provide a reasonable measure of economic opportunity. So long as this duty is sought to be discharged honestly and intelligently, the group authority is obviously entitled to the loyal support of the group members.

But the measure of this loyalty becomes excessive in consequence of international conditions, partly imagined and partly real.

The role of the state as protector against violence from without is, as we have seen, apt to be magnified in consequence of the portrayal of other peoples or governments as evil, and as motivated by aggressive or selfish qualities. We have already considered the possibility of a more sympathetic conception of other states, more nearly in harmony with the actual facts. We considered this primarily from the standpoint of reducing the apparent conflicts of desire between nation personalities as such. But any progress which

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can be made in this respect will equally operate to dilute the feeling of the individual that his group authority is an indispensable protector and shield against the ever-present threat of violence from without.

As regards economic opportunity the group authority has a duty, a duty which it may or may not perform to the full extent that circumstances permit. But there is always a limiting factor upon the degree of opportunity which the authority can dispense and that is found in the limits to the national domain. Beyond its national boundaries the sovereign cannot go, as a matter of right, in the quest of greater opportunity for its people. It may, by treaty, obtain for them some small degree of opportunity abroad. But, generally speaking, the individual enjoys opportunity abroad only as a matter of sufferance. Each sovereign has and fundamentally reserves the legal right to give its own people a monopoly of the opportunities within its borders.

The right thus possessed is largely exercised. Partly as a result of conscious decision, partly in consequence of policies adopted for other reasons, national boundaries have come to be barriers substantially barring those without from availing of opportunities within.

Deliberate measures to effect this result are, typically, restrictions on immigration and even on temporary visits; restriction of imports through tariffs, quotas and embargoes; restriction on exports; restrictions on alien ownership of real estate and upon alien investment in many types of enterprises. Such measures, which are manifold, are deliberately

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designed to prevent aliens from sharing in domestic opportunities and to conserve them for the national group.

Superimposed upon such deliberate restrictions are those incident to the fact that it is difficult to exchange one's domestic money for foreign money. It is impossible to travel abroad, buy abroad or invest abroad without the use of foreign money. But there are today very few currencies of the world which are freely exchangeable into foreign moneys. The fact that the purchasing power of one's domestic money is limited to the national territory, and that this money is not readily exchangeable for other money, adds notably to the barrier effect of boundaries.

The number of persons who seek opportunity abroad is, of course, limited. But we cannot conclude that the problem is consequently unimportant. If there are few who would in fact take advantage of opportunity abroad, there are many who imagine that they would like to do so and who in any event are resentful at feeling that they are not free to do so if and when this should seem desirable. Further, the type of person who aspires for opportunity abroad generally represents the more adventurous, the more dynamic, element in the population. It is an element which is usually influential, and formative of the national ideal, to a degree far beyond its numerical strength.¹

More important than any of these considerations is the portrayal made by the group authority of the boundary-

¹ We do not in this paragraph refer to political refugees. They, of course, do not entertain the nation-benefactor concept, the dilution of which we are here discussing.

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barrier situation. If the group members are dynamic, it will often prove impossible for the group authority to make them satisfied with their measure of opportunity. This may in fact be due to the ineptness of the group authority. It may in fact be due to an actual paucity of natural advantages. It may be due to a combination of the two. But in any event, the group authority, if faced by a dynamic internal demand which cannot be met, will usually seek to excuse itself by emphasizing the limitations incident to the boundary barriers and by giving the impression that enhancement of opportunity can be obtained only as these barriers are pushed back or broken through. As a people thus become boundary conscious, there develops in turn a sense of restraint and repression. We have claustrophobia on a national scale. Thus are bred the abnormal emotions which so readily crystallize to drive a people into violence and war. Before this climax is reached, and as a precursor to it, we have accentuation of the concept of the state as Benefactor. It alone can act effectively in international affairs. The individual as such has no status. He is forced to depend upon his group authority and, he reasons, if he is loyal and subservient to it, the authority may develop sufficient power to press back or break through the barriers and then in turn be able to provide more abundantly for those who are starved as to opportunity.

There is much which can be done, within the realm of the practical, to moderate this situation. The barrier aspect of boundaries can be greatly lessened. Individuals can be made less boundary conscious. They can be made to feel that opportunity beyond their boundaries is reasonably available to

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them, and that they need not pay the price of blind allegiance to their sovereign in order to obtain opportunity outside of their present boundaries. Other states, as well as their own, can, by providing such opportunity, play the role of benefactor. Their own state will no longer have a unique claim to that title.

The United States of America constitutes a significant illustration of the extent to which exaggerated nationalistic conceptions can be shrunk through the opening up of boundaries. This union was formed by states which at the time asserted full sovereign rights. They were jealous of and even hostile toward each other. Each was disposed, in the conventional way, to build up the prosperity of its own group membership by monopolizing opportunity for the benefit of the group members. In each of such states the nation-hero-benefactor concept was highly developed.

The situation, however, was such that the states could not afford to perpetuate conditions which would surely lead to strife among themselves. This would have meant that some European power would step in to destroy the independence which the states had hardly won. Accordingly, they adopted a treaty (known as the Constitution) whereby each renounced the right to interfere with the interstate movement of people, goods and ideas. In order that such renunciation might be fruitful of practical results, they arranged to establish a single monetary unit. Subject to such renunciations, each state retained a large measure of sovereignty. Each independently legislated as to all social, educational and religious matters. Each maintained its own police

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force. Each had its own courts and its own system of taxes.² Legal, social, labor and material conditions varied greatly as between them. Nevertheless, at once it became a matter of quite secondary importance where state boundaries ran. The resident of one state could invest his money in another or call on capital from another to finance his own investment; he could buy or sell goods in another state and, if he chose, travel freely back and forth and enjoy an unrestricted exchange of ideas.

Thus when in a given state there existed inadequacy of economic opportunity in relation to the dynamic demand, this could not be blamed upon the selfish and repressive policy of other states, for there always existed the possibility of projecting one's interests beyond the state line.

Under such circumstances the conception of the state as a quasi-deity and sole benefactor became quickly diluted to normal proportions. Each individual citizen respected and was loyal to his own state. There persisted a healthy rivalry with other states and many took pride in advancing the efficacy of their state authority in dealing with such matters as public health, public education, control of crime, labor conditions, *etc.* But the abnormalities and excesses usually incident to national ideology largely evaporated. It became recognized that other states were decent and to be respected; that they were the source of much of the opportunity which all enjoyed and that there was no warrant for a fanatical,

²The power to impose income taxes has now been given to the Federal Government. This occurred by voluntary alteration of the "treaty," *i.e.*, the Constitution.

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exclusive and blind allegiance to one's own state as the only source of individual opportunity.

There occurred, to be sure, the Civil War. This, however, was not the usual type of war wherein one state sought to enlarge its domain at the expense of another which sought to maintain the *status quo*. The Civil War was essentially a war to determine whether or not the Federal relationship was permanent and to be perpetuated. It reflected an effort by some states to reestablish a condition under which they might again turn their boundaries into barriers against other states. They desired to withdraw from an arrangement soundly conceived to promote peace and prosperity. That, if ever, was a "war to end war" so far as the states were concerned. If it had been admitted that any state, for any interest or pretext, could withdraw from the Union and reestablish itself as fully sovereign, with the customary restrictions of intercourse with others, then there would have begun again the process which would inevitably have accentuated state boundary lines to a point where the typical nationalistic ideology would have developed and wars between the states would have become inevitable.

It may be argued that the establishment of good working relations between the states and their populations only became possible through the substitution of a new national personification (the Federation) and that there were retained the nation-hero versus nation-villain personifications, the nation-hero representing merely a consolidation into one of the several separate personifications theretofore represented by the different states.

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Certainly the American experiment does not prove that it is possible to have a national group authority function effectively without the stimulus of the nation-hero versus nation-villain concept. With the consummation of the Union and the setting up of a federated authority having sole jurisdiction in international matters, there quickly developed a typical personification of this Federal authority. This personified entity was deemed the agency for the enlargement of opportunity through pressing back the limits of boundary. There occurred a dynamic, nationalistic expansion.

Even though this be admitted, the American experiment does, however, constitute evidence that if the barrier effect of boundaries is greatly diminished, the group personifications become much less accentuated and the benefactor concept much diluted. We can reasonably expect that like results would flow from a like treatment of other boundary problems.

The pattern of the United States cannot, of course, be applied to all the nations of the world. This is concededly not practical. There is, however, much that can be done along these lines, particularly as between nations which have close physical and economic relations.

What are the apertures which it is practical to cut in the boundaries of sovereignty? We must recognize that there is no uniform procedure which can be applied. We cannot treat all boundaries alike. A distinction must be made between those which enclose a highly developed and industrialized society and those which enclose areas which are, as yet inadequately developed. The former cannot be suddenly

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exposed to new competitive conditions without serious disturbance. When a social system has been created which itself provides a large measure of opportunity and absorbs much human energy, then we would not advance our objective were we to effect international changes which were so radical and abrupt as to destroy these opportunities. This would constitute an incursion from without which would engender ill will and might in reaction lead to an intensification of the protective role of the group authority in the commercially invaded country.

This is not to suggest that there is nothing to be done by the industrial nations. There is much that they can contribute. Take, for example, the matter of international monetary exchange. We have noted how purely national moneys, which are unstable and non-exchangeable in relation to other moneys, constitute a most severe restraint to travel, the movement of goods and people, and the participation, through investment, in natural advantages and greater opportunities which are abroad. There can be a reestablishment of national monetary units in some reasonably stable relationship to each other. There can, in addition, be some gradual removal of barriers to the exchange of goods, particularly with a view to facilitating access to raw materials.³ Care must be taken to avoid economic disturbance on a wide scale. In a desire to provide opportunity in one quarter, we must not destroy it in another. We must, as previously noted, avoid the artificial stimulus of international trade on bases

³ The interchangeability of national moneys is, of course, dependent upon a balance—direct or triangular—with respect to exchange of goods and services.

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which are neither mutually advantageous nor permanent and which consequently lead to disillusionment. But consistently with this, something can be done, by a selective readjustment of duties and of quotas, to relieve the impression that boundaries are barriers, particularly to trade necessary for the procurement of needed raw materials.

Measures could undoubtedly be taken to facilitate the movement of people across national boundary lines. This does not mean that the door should be thrown open to wholesale immigration, particularly of an artificial and non-spontaneous character such, for example, as the importation of "contract labor." The objective which we here envisage is the diminution within a state of internal pressure upon its government to play the part of "benefactor" by opening up or pushing back boundary barriers. Therefore the handling of boundaries to be sought is one which will tend to obviate this pressure. This particularly means assuring facilities, to go and come, for those individuals who are sufficiently venturesome or imaginative to desire to go beyond their own borders in quest of adventure or novelty or learning, or in furtherance of their commercial interests. As we pointed out, the number of such persons in any state is relatively small. But because their dynamic influence is usually large in proportion to their number, it is of importance that they should not feel their personal movements are artificially confined by the boundary policies of others.

It is to be borne in mind that our primary objective is to change the popular impression which one people has of the boundaries of another. The present picture is too frequently that of bleak and forbidding barriers erected in total disre-

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gard of their external consequences. This can largely be changed by improved international manners. The present attitude of most nations is: I am sovereign; I do as I choose, without accounting to anyone; and I choose to keep out the foreigners, their goods and their chattels. Boundary barriers thus created inevitably arouse resentment abroad and a desire for leadership able and willing to push back or break open such boundaries. It is possible, on the other hand, to treat these matters as a common problem of economic balance and to seek to impart an understanding of the domestic considerations which require protective action. There is, indeed, already a growing disposition to treat international trade as a matter of bilateral negotiation rather than of internal fiat. This new technique can serve to alter greatly the old conception of boundaries. It may, indeed, prove feasible in certain cases to go further and to secure desired protection by the voluntary act of foreign nations restricting their exports or emigration. An illustration was the so-called "gentleman's agreement" between Japan and the United States, whereby Japan took over the responsibility of herself restricting emigration to the United States. This changed approach greatly improved relations between the two countries. It would be useful to increase the utilization of such procedure.

We should not be under any illusions as to the possibility of fundamentally altering world economy with a view to equalizing opportunity. Each nation will continue to make its boundaries serve the interests of its domestic economy. Opportunity will continue in the future, as in the past, to be

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most readily available to those in geographical propinquity thereto. But there can be a broader and longer range vision of what is the best interest of the domestic economy; there can be an avoidance of minor obstructions which produce irritations out of all proportion to their substantive importance. Above all, there can be a change of technique and of manners so that a people will not feel affronted by the action of foreign governments and consequently led to regard their own government as an indispensable medium for breaking down or pushing back the offensive barriers.

Measures such as the foregoing may be taken by the highly developed industrial nations. When we move on to those nations which are less highly developed, and particularly when we consider colonial areas, a much more ambitious program may be found practical. In such areas monopoly of opportunity is not maintained by or for the benefit of the local population. The boundary barriers do not protect a highly developed form of society which might suffer severe dislocation were the protection abruptly withdrawn. In the colonial areas the sovereignty system is operated by the colonizing or mandatory power to the end that its nationals may have a preferential right of exploitation. There would seem to be no insuperable obstacle to opening up vast areas of the world through the application of the principles of the "mandate" system as proposed by President Wilson, namely, that the territory is to be administered in trust, first for the well-being and advancement of the local populations, and then for the benefit and equal opportunity of the whole world.

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There can, we think, be little question that measures of the foregoing character would strikingly modify the present ideology which is so provocative of war. We would have created a world situation such that the individual need no longer feel obligated to look to and be subservient to his group authority as the only defense against the selfishness of others. It would also be more difficult for the several group authorities to explain their own failures as due to the paucity of resources out of which to carve opportunity for the group members. The conception of foreign group authorities as essentially selfish and repellent, would be inevitably modified. Above all we would have put a stop to the development of mass abnormalities which, akin to claustrophobia, are primarily consequent upon a sense of restraint and repression. Such feeling of being restrained, even if it be imaginary, urgently requires a cure. If a cure can be found we will again have struck at that abnormal mass emotionalism which is the indispensable base for totalitarian war.

Our conclusions have so far derived from consideration of the "ethical" solution. We initially saw that, within small units, conflicts of desire could be mitigated by developing and directing a disposition, on the part of the individual, to subordinate his personal material desires and to seek satisfaction through promoting the welfare of others. Where, however, the "other" is a personified and non-universal entity deemed to have desires conflicting with those of other personified beings, then such individual self-subordination and willingness to sacrifice becomes an instrument not of

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peace but for the prosecution of totalitarian warfare. We have considered means whereby this dangerous perversion of the spirit of self-sacrifice might be corrected. This, we felt, might be done (a) by avoiding that exaggeration of international conflict of desire which flows from the "devil" qualities attributed to other nations; (b) by substituting for the own-nation deity concept some spiritual ideal which transcends national lines; and (c) by international practices which will to some extent open up opportunity throughout the world and where this seems impracticable at least mitigate the unequal result by manners which are courteous and conducive to international understanding. Thus we may diminish the sense of dependence on one's own state as a necessary agency for combating the selfishness and arbitrariness of others.

X

APPLICATION OF THE "POLITICAL" PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION

WHEN we initially considered the operation of the ethical solution within existing national groups, we saw that it did not in itself serve to assure the avoidance of violence. There remained conflicting desires which required a solvent. An arbiter—a group authority—was a necessary alternative to force as a solvent.

We can come to the same conclusion in the international realm, although with some qualification. We saw that conflicts of desire between actual human beings do not assume, in the international field, sufficient volume to explain, in themselves, totalitarian warfare. We further saw that these conflicts of desire are largely subject to pacific solution through the action of the several group authorities. International warfare, in the present state of society, is largely due to perversions of the imagination, to the artificial stimulus of emotion and to the dedication of the masses, under emotional influence, to an ideology which is in large part fictitious. Totalitarian warfare is an act of mass sacrifice, and if the occasion for sacrifice could be seen in its true light we would have measurably attained our objective.

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It is thus theoretically possible that a solution of the problem of totalitarian warfare might be found without resort to the authoritarian solution. But we must assume that progress will be slow in mitigating the present ideology in relation to our own and other states. In the meantime, we must treat the problem as one created by a group of personified nations, each commanding the allegiance and sacrificial devotion of its people, and each having desires and ambitions (static or dynamic) conflicting with those of others. So long as such a situation persists, some resort to the authoritarian solution is indispensable if force is to be avoided.

It is obviously impracticable to attempt presently to establish an international authority which will play a role, as between the nations, comparable to that played by the political authority as it has developed within existing national groups. We saw that the group authority operated under a mandate to establish conditions which would strike a fair balance between the dynamic and static desires of the group members. It is a condition of its being that it permit a measure of retention, sufficient to stimulate and reward productive effort, and that it permit a measure of change and taking away sufficient to prevent the damming up of dynamic and acquisitive forces to a point where violent outbreak becomes inevitable. The endowment of an authority with these prerogatives involves a large measure of abdication of individual freedom. Those who desire perpetuation of the *status quo* and indefinite retention of what they have must largely subordinate their desires to the dictates of the authority, contenting themselves with the fact that at least the *status quo* will

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change only gradually and then not by violence. Those who desire a change in the *status quo* and to acquire what others have, must accept the peaceful and sometimes slow procedures established by the authority and renounce the quick and direct methods of force. In both cases individual freedom is sharply curtailed.

This, translated into the international field, would mean a substantial abandonment of "sovereignty" as now conceived. It is of the essence of sovereignty that the sovereign shall be able to do what it pleases, without regard to the dictates of any other entity.

Whatever theory may dictate, it is abundantly clear that the nations of the world are not prepared to surrender their sovereignty in any degree comparable to the surrender by the individual of his liberty of action.

However, we must remember that the national authority, as we now know it, is a matter of slow evolution over the centuries. Like everything else, it had its beginning and its beginning involved no more than the germ of what has evolved, as trial and error have pointed the way of usefulness. There is no reason why, in the field of international affairs, we should not make a beginning, in view of the imperative necessity therefor. We saw that, in the case of the federation of North American states, it was fear of war which led the states to set up a central arbiter and partially subordinate their sovereignty thereto by renouncing, in favor of each other, the right to interfere with interstate commerce. War is today a possibility more real and more terrifying than ever before. It would seem that some slight compromise of

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sovereignty might be practically realizable if there were a reasonable chance that this would reduce the danger of war.

In our discussion of past efforts at peace, we found that an initial step had, in fact, already been taken in the way of the authoritarian solution. This was the incorporation in the Covenant of the League of Article 19 authorizing the Assembly of the League from time to time to "advise the reconsideration . . . of treaties which may have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."

The Assembly did not thereby become an "authority" in the full sense as developed within the national group. It was accorded no legal power to reform treaties or to change international conditions. But it was accorded a moral position in those respects which constitute at least a sound first step toward realizing the "authority" concept. There are inherent in Article 19 the elements essential to an effectively functioning authority, namely: (a) the objective—avoidance of violence; (b) the means—a periodic but measured alteration of the *status quo*, designed to strike an acceptable balance between the dynamic and static desires of the national groups; and (c) the placing of responsibility for achieving this balance in the hands of an impartial and continuous body owing a responsibility to all. By another Article, sanctions were provided.

It may be impracticable to put this particular provision (Article 19) to work. The League is to some extent dismembered and to a considerable extent discredited. Perhaps Article 19 has at all times constituted too ambitious a begin-

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ning. But the basic concept of this Article must sooner or later be given practical application. Without it we cannot have a peace which is other than an armed and precarious truce. We cannot have peace which is predicated upon principle or which is other than a matter of expediency.

Before considering how the concept of Article 19 might be implemented, it will be well to consider in the abstract certain general characteristics of "change." Also, we should consider the different categories of change which are possible in the international field.

There are certain general laws of change which we should be aware of and take into account. Change is the result of the dynamic prevailing over the static. There is always resistance to change, just as there is always the impulse to change. We cannot say in the abstract that change in itself is good any more than we can say that permanency is good. Obviously there are some forms of change which should be and can be resisted. There are existing institutions which deserve to be preserved. However, by and large, the dynamic prevails over the static. That is why we have a world which, in all its phases, is a changing world. If, however, man cannot prevent change from occurring, he can, if he is intelligent, impart to change a certain selectivity. He can influence the form which change assumes and the rate at which it occurs. He can deflect the impact of change away from *values*, if not things.

Dynamic forces are usually detectable at an early stage. Man has had centuries of experience and experimentation which permit him to identify forces of a kind which become

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more powerful if they are sought to be resisted and contained. We also know that the impulse for change is usually moderate and malleable at an early stage. It is then disposed to adapt itself to and accept such openings as may be offered. If, however, the impulse to change is of a character destined to become increasingly intense, then with delay it becomes a force which masters, rather than a force which can be controlled and directed. As dynamic pressure grows, there develops a momentum behind a given form of change; its direction cannot at that time be readily altered. Furthermore, resistance or delay serves to pile up forces which make the change, when it occurs, violent in character.

Generally speaking, we have a choice between a condition of change which is fairly constant and which, because it is constant, can be moderated and constructively guided, or a condition of rigidity, interspersed with violent change which is irrational and destructive.

Those of responsibility in any field of life, if they are wise, are constantly on the watch for symptoms which foreshadow the necessity for change. If detected at an early stage, adjustment can be offered which will serve to prevent a damming up of dynamic forces to a degree such that violent and drastic change becomes inescapable. Change, if skilfully induced, is almost imperceptible until viewed in retrospect. This is the ideal form of change. It avoids that spectacular and grandiose massing of dynamic and static elements which in itself excludes intelligence from any guiding role.

We have seen that in international affairs the dynamic energies of peoples rise and fall. So long as this occurs and

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so long as the nation ideology prevails and national domains are a matter of practical and sentimental importance, then national domains must themselves be subject to change. From our consideration of change in the abstract we can draw the conclusion that changes in international domains, if they are to be moderate and rational, must be timely. If they are to be timely, the influences working for change must be detected at an incipient stage and before they become conspicuous. The fact of conspicuousness is in itself evidence that dynamic pressure for change has already accumulated to a degree such that violent and emotional characteristics are likely. Further, if we are to have change which is timely, those who desire the *status quo* must abandon the position that no change should be made until the necessity therefor is demonstrated by the growth of overwhelming pressure. They must abandon this position even at the risk of acquiescing in some changes which in retrospect may seem to have been avoidable.

Let us now turn to a more particular consideration of the possible categories of change in national domains. We must first make clear that when we speak of the "national domain" we refer not merely to territory which is under the sole control of national authority but we include the entire nexus of treaties and international practices which define and confine the position of a nation and its nationals. Proceeding from this definition, we can roughly classify into three categories the possible changes in the national domain. Of these the first relates to the moral and social standing of a nation and its nationals. A second category relates to political and

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economic influence beyond the confines of the national territory. The third relates to the national territory itself. Of these three categories, the most difficult in which to effect change is obviously the third, involving a transfer of territory from one sovereign to another. This form of change, if it involves populated areas and if it occurs abruptly, always involves serious disadvantages to the peoples concerned. These may arise out of ethnic or economic considerations, or often both. Further, transfer of territory encounters the strongest form of emotional resistance since loss of territory has become symbolic of loss of national prestige. For the nation-hero to consent to the surrender of territory, is popularly deemed disgrace or disaster. Because, however, this form of change is the most drastic, it is the form of change which is apt to occur if the forces for change are repressed to a point where they become violent and emotional. This conforms with the general law of change which we have noted.

If there exists a particular form of international change which is peculiarly obnoxious, and difficult to effect calmly and rationally, and if this form of change is a characteristic result of dynamic pressures which have become violent through repression, then the conclusion seems obvious that these dynamic pressures should be detected and dealt with at an early stage when they can perhaps be accommodated to one of the other two categories of change of national domain.

There is no great difficulty in detecting in the international field the coming into being of dynamic forces of a kind which must be dealt with. We are aware of those characteristics

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which, in the case of individuals, lead to advance in material and social status. Energy, industry, clean-living, thrift, efficiency, intelligence, willingness to forego present ease in the interest of future gains—these are characteristics to which, as a practical matter, opportunity is accorded. Indolence, dissipation, waste, inefficiency, stupidity, lack of tenacity—these are characteristics which, in a well ordered society, will be materially penalized. These consequences which flow from the respective sets of characteristics are not due to the fact that possession of the first group predisposes to violence, while possession of the second group predisposes to passivity. On the contrary, those who possess the first group of characteristics are generally indisposed to violence. Adventurers, soldiers of fortune, criminals are usually possessors of the second group of characteristics. But society makes way for the first and not for the second. This is because if willingness to bear the hardships of reciprocal force is joined with the first group of characteristics, then there is created a dynamic pressure which becomes increasingly potent until it is either satisfied or exhausted by desperate struggle. In the case of possessors of the second group of characteristics, there may be sporadic and even frequent outbursts, but these can safely be repressed. There are not present the elements which make for sustained dynamic pressure.

The characteristics of a national group are obviously not uniform, but peoples acquire, and attribute to their nation-hero, certain dominant characteristics. These reflect one or another of those two groups to which we have referred. If the dominant characteristics of a people are of the first group

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and become coupled with a willingness to endure the rigor of combat, then we are in the presence of a dynamic situation which cannot be repressed save at great peril and great cost.

The characteristics of a people are not susceptible of concealment. We can readily detect in a people the presence of qualities which must either have opportunity or else there will occur a repression of dynamic forces which will make inevitable a violent, sustained and destructive outbreak.

In all peoples there occur, at times when the dynamic element is potent, combinations of conditions which make for an adventurousness that is apt to seek an outlet in war. These conditions include physiological and environmental factors. From the psychological standpoint, they may be induced purely by internal stimuli. The existence of these conditions is an explosive force, the detonation of which can be avoided only under the most careful handling. Its very existence is a temptation to those who seek power and incidentally may visualize material gains. There is always danger that thereby explosion will be induced. Examples are the French alliance with Italy against Austria in 1859; Great Britain's conflict with the Boers in 1899; and the wars waged by the United States against Mexico in 1848 and Spain in 1898. To be sure these were not totalitarian wars, but analogy is not, on that account, wholly lacking.

Given the other appropriate factors, psychological readiness for war will be enormously stimulated by a sense of external oppression.

In order to illustrate and emphasize the conclusions to which we have come, we will consider some changes which

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have occurred since the World War in the case of Japan, Italy and Germany.

The Japanese are a people of great energy. They possess to a marked degree those qualities which we have referred to as requiring an adequate national domain. Their own territory is meager in quantity and quality. Some enlargement of their national domain seemed called for. At the close of the World War the form of change which Japan most wanted was of the first category we referred to, namely, an enhanced moral and social status in the world. She strove for some recognition in the League Covenant of the principle of racial equality. If this had been accorded in spirit as well as form, the pressure for further change would have been greatly allayed. Actually the change sought by Japan was denied in both spirit and form.

As dynamic pressure grew with the closing of the outlet first desired, Japan intensified her efforts to enlarge otherwise her domain. Barriers existent elsewhere made China appear to be the point of least resistance. Manchuria was absorbed by a military operation. As regards China proper, the ambition of Japan appeared, in its first phases, to be of the second category, namely, a projection of political and economic influence without actual annexation. What Japan particularly sought was a position comparable to that enjoyed by the English. The Chinese currency had been created by English experts, was tied to the pound sterling and was largely British managed. The Chinese customs were primarily under British control. The same was largely true of ports, railroads and communications. With this background of con-

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trol over instrumentalities of trade and finance, British trade flourished.

No concessions were made to this objective and it seemed to the Japanese that there was no peaceful way of achieving that which was sought. There developed the conception of a military coup which would overthrow the Chinese government, which was estimated to be a puppet without strong domestic support. Another puppet government would then be substituted which would give to Japan that which England had. The situation was miscalculated. Out of it there has developed an attempt at the military conquest of all China. The change now contemplated goes far beyond anything which was originally conceived, and the results will be disastrous, not only to China and Japan, but to England and other western powers which might otherwise have been able to maintain some substantial part of the *status quo*.

Italy at the Paris Peace Conference had been treated as a second rate power. Her performance during the war was looked upon as far from creditable and her people were regarded as in a phase of decline. When Italian delegates withdrew from the Conference as a protest against the treatment proposed to be accorded Italy, the Conference continued undisturbed, much to Italian chagrin, and in their absence the treaty provisions were tentatively redrafted so as further to curtail Italian gains. The subsequent energizing of Italy under Mussolini plainly showed that Italy had become a nation quite different from that which had been so cavalierly treated at the Peace Conference. There occurred a qualitative revolution. Industry, discipline and willingness to sacrifice seemed

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to replace slothfulness and laxity. The change in national domain first sought by this reborn Italy was not territorial or even economic; it rather belonged to the first category of change, *i.e.*, change of moral and social status. Aware of past indignities and slights, Italy became insistent that she should now be recognized as a major power and she particularly sought such recognition in relation to Mediterranean affairs. England and France did not welcome Italy as an equal partner. The Ethiopian war ensued. Ethiopia became a victim, not because of its intrinsic worth—which is problematic—but because its conquest would be symbolic of Italy's new stature and would tend to compel acceptance of Italy as a major factor in the Mediterranean area. The refusal of England and France, at the close of the Ethiopian campaign, to recognize Italy's conquest probably led to Italy's vigorous participation in the Spanish revolution. It was felt that an Italy having a foothold at both the entrance to and exit from the Mediterranean would compel England and France to take Italy into account.

The status sought by Italy is finally being conceded. But it is being conceded in consequence of, and not in avoidance of, regrettable and dangerous events.

Germany emerged from the World War with her energy exhausted as a result of the war effort and of the blockade. There ensued a short period of moral and physical decadence. But energy was quickly restored, partly as a result of purely natural causes and partly under the smart of what, to German eyes, seemed the gross injustices of the Treaty of Versailles.

As in the case of Japan and Italy, a first desire was for

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moral and social rehabilitation. As the German people interpreted the Treaty, it had forced them to accept moral guilt for the World War. They had, in this respect, been publicly branded, and by many provisions of the Treaty they felt placed in a position of inferiority. As redress in these respects was slow in coming, demand crystallized for relief in specific respects from restrictions of the Treaty. The armament provisions by that time seemed obsolete by reason of the failure of the Allied powers to carry out the reciprocal disarmament which the Treaty contemplated. Yet no mechanism functioned for remedial action. Finally, the restraints of the Treaty were drastically overthrown by Germany's unilateral action. There was rapidly created in Germany a military establishment which dwarfed the maximum aspirations of a few years before.

The complete and perpetual severance of Germany and Austria was looked upon with misgiving, even at the Peace Conference. Many felt that this provision was artificial and in the nature of things could be but temporary. The dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the economic position of Austria made logical some rapprochement with Germany. Demand therefor soon arose in both countries. A trade agreement was negotiated which, by a close and dubious vote of the World Court, was held to involve a technical infraction of the post-war treaty structure. The attempt to perpetuate literally and rigidly the peace treaty terms probably accounted for the downfall of the moderate Brüning, the intensification of the forces for change which Hitler

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was leading and the ultimate total annexation of Austria by Germany.

The status of the Sudeten Germans had given concern to the Allied Statesmen in Paris. The question of reuniting them with Germany was seriously weighed. Ethnic consideration strongly called for such action. On the other hand, strategic and economic considerations suggested that they should be incorporated in the new state of Czechoslovakia. In the final decision the latter considerations prevailed. The Czechs, naturally if unwisely, retaliating for past mistreatment, discriminated against the German element, and even after twenty years the Sudeten Germans had never become loyal to or truly integrated into the Czechoslovak state. A sense of grievance constantly persisted. When Austria was annexed by Germany, the Sudetens, under German instigation, agitated their grievances more openly and pressed more vigorously for change in their status. They had for years hoped for nothing more radical than the acquisition of local autonomy within the framework of the Czechoslovak state. But their demands grew under the sponsorship of Hitler. Hungarians and Poles took up the cry of "self-determination." Under the menace of world war, change was finally granted of so extreme a character as to alter drastically both the territorial and political status of Czechoslovakia.

The foregoing recitals are not by way of defense. What has happened to China and Ethiopia and to many Austrians and Czechs is repugnant to civilized mankind. We can but feel shame that we are part of and have helped to fashion a world in which such events occur. But if we would prevent

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the recurrence of change which in method and result is cruel and which in itself contains the seeds of further trouble, then we must study dispassionately the interplay of cause and effect. The causes and effects may not be precisely as we have portrayed them. There is room for much difference of opinion and of choice of emphasis. Brevity admittedly compels inadequacy and perhaps inaccuracy. But however history be appraised we cannot fail to find, running through the events of the past twenty years, a destructive pattern. There is, first, a growth of energy and vigor among a people, fundamentally worthy, who feel that their national domain—using this word in all of its three senses—involves inadequacies which irk and against which they press. The demand for change at its inception is generally moderate and largely justifiable. It is seldom a demand for change of territorial status. More often, in its early stages, it is a demand for moral and social appeasement, and for a greater economic opportunity. The world is too rigid in its structure and thinking to accommodate itself promptly to such demands. Indeed, their very moderation prevents their being considered as of major importance, and gives the impression that they may with safety be ignored. But, since we are dealing with dynamic peoples possessed of effective characteristics, the perpetuation of rigidities merely serves to intensify the pressure. The demand for change becomes more violent, more emotional and less rational. The measure of desired change increases by leaps and bounds; it alters in character until it finally assumes the most extreme form. The emotional power which has been generated becomes a powerful explosive and un-

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less restrained by equal or greater power breaks forth in acts of violence.

This sequence of events, which we can trace in the case of Japan, Italy and Germany, is precisely that which we ought to have expected and been able to foresee if we had been guided by our knowledge of dynamics—whether animal or physical—in other fields. What has happened confirms our theoretical conclusion, that if any mechanism for change is to be of practical value it must be designed, first, to detect at their inception the forces operating for international change; second, to appraise intelligently the potentiality of their growth and intensification; third, to appraise the likelihood of this dynamic energy finding adequate outlet through the existence or creation of internal opportunities; and fourth, to recommend *promptly* such alteration of the international status as may seem necessary to prevent the growth of powerful forces emotionally committed to exaggerated and drastic change.

We cannot meet these tests if we defer setting up remedial machinery until a crisis has arisen. It is then too late. This is shown by the negative results of the Lytton report to the League on Manchuria, the Hoare-Laval proposal on Ethiopia and the Runciman mission to Czechoslovakia. We should, preferably, have a continuing agency of semi-permanent personnel engaged in constant study of international situations. It might also be desirable, if such an effort seemed practicable, that it should be on the basis of distinctive geographical areas. Each hemisphere, each continent, and often smaller geographical areas, have distinctive problems of

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their own. If prompt cognizance is taken of the need for change, it will often be found that change of a local character will suffice. Nations in geographical propinquity have responsibilities toward each other. The discharge of such responsibilities should be treated as a problem common to such states.

As we have repeatedly emphasized, it would be utopian, in the present state of world opinion, to attempt to establish any body having authority to dictate changes in the national domains. No nation would consent to delegate to others such powers over its own life. But experimentation in ways which would commit no nation could now be usefully attempted. If the experiment succeeded, then its implications would be farreaching. Few would begrudge the consequence of success.

In our original description of the ethical and authoritarian solutions, we pointed out that there was often no clear line of demarcation between them. We find this to be the case when we seek to apply such solutions to the problem of international violence. In our present chapter, we are dealing with the possibilities of developing the authoritarian approach. We have suggested that on the basis of impartial study changes might be made of a modest character which would prevent the necessity of changes of so drastic a character as bring shock to the lives of millions. Measures designed to achieve this objective may in many respects be similar to those which we suggested in our previous chapter dealing with the ethical solution. We there pointed out that

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the normal operation of the ethical principle of sacrifice was obstructed by an ideology which involved an exaggerated nation-benefactor concept. We suggested that this concept could be diluted by measures which, partly because of their form and partly because of their substance, would create an atmosphere of greater social and economic equality. We felt that while, in the case of the highly industrialized powers, reform would principally be evidenced by more courteous international manners and modes of operation, much more of a practical nature could be done to open up colonial areas to greater equality of opportunity. If measures such as the foregoing will serve to dilute the nation-benefactor concept and facilitate the ethical approach, the same measures may equally serve the "political" solution. They involve changes in one or another phase of national domains, and thus afford outlet to energies which, if repressed, will demand change of a character which we would avoid. This is particularly true if undeveloped colonial areas can be made to attract from the dynamic countries those of adventurous disposition. It will also frequently be the case that states in geographical propinquity can, by cooperative and complementary effort, increase the opportunities for the peoples of both and provide domestic outlets for dynamic forces within them which otherwise might have wide international repercussions. Much that has been said in that portion of our preceding chapter could be repeated here as indicative of possibilities of change which may serve to prevent dynamic forces attaining a dangerous intensity.

If our program for diluting the nation-benefactor concept

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would serve also to promote the authoritarian solution, so also our program for the authoritarian solution might serve to dilute the nation-benefactor and nation-villain concepts. We have dealt at some length with the ideology of conflict reflected by the nation-hero versus nation-villain concept. Happily, however, this ideology is not universal. While practically all peoples visualize their own nation as hero, and while they usually visualize one or more other-nations as villains, they do not visualize *all* other-nations as villains. There has grown up between many countries a sense of comradeship and of friendliness which operates as a most effective preventive of war. The nation-villain ideology has in such cases been rejected, and a contrary ideology so firmly implanted that it cannot be readily changed. Such a spirit exists between the Scandinavian countries. It exists between England and the self-governing Dominions. It exists between Canada and the United States. In each of these cases there is, in embryo, a "polity," which transcends national lines and which is no less real because it is informal. Such oases constitute very precious contributions to the cause of international peace. If through bodies of study and inquiry, set up on geographical bases, a community spirit could be developed, this might well serve to enlarge and multiply still further those groups of nations which felt a sense of comradeship and common polity and which rejected, as regards each other, the nation-villain concept.

It may be felt that throughout this chapter we have placed undue reliance upon imponderables and have entertained unreasonable hopes that tangible changes in territory could be

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avoided. We have spoken of courtesy in dealing with boundary barriers, of comradeship of national groups, of changes in social status or political and economic influence. But, it will be asked, are such intangibles an acceptable substitute for more land and more people which a sovereign may starkly demand? No categorical answer can be given. But we can say with confidence that imponderables can, to a large degree, be offset against ponderables. We know that this is true in the realm of individual human affairs. It is not infrequent for individuals to make large donations, not out of any sense of duty to fellow-men, but because they appraise the resultant acclaim more highly than the material loss. Men accept office at great financial sacrifice because they value honorable position more than material gain. Social recognition is often sought at great expense. Titles, decorations and honors serve widely in lieu of money. The terms of business transactions will often be influenced by social amenities and by the personal harmony or disharmony of the negotiators.

Nations, under the influence of personification, are like humans. Intangibles can play an important role in achieving satisfactions. One who is acquainted with Japan cannot doubt the profound significance to Japan of the social question. The Berlin-Rome axis rests, above all, on the fact that thereby Germany and Italy obtain, as between themselves, a sense of equality and reciprocal expression of esteem, the lack of which was keenly felt in their dealings with other nations.

But it should at all times be borne in mind that the objective sought is not necessarily the total elimination of territo-

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rial change. Since, however, it is the most difficult form of change to effect peacefully and without shock, other possibilities should first be exhausted. These possibilities are great, far greater than is usually perceived. But we cannot expect thereby for all time to obviate territorial changes. It may be the case that the absorption of Austria by Germany has, since 1919, been inevitable. It may be that the Czechoslovak state was inherently too artificial to remain intact. It may be that Italy was destined to increase her African colonial empire and that Japan was destined, for a period, to dominate neighboring parts of Asia. Even if all of these changes were inevitable, it detracts not one whit from our argument. Change, even in territory, is not evil of itself. Evil may be in the manner of its happening. If territory is acquired through an outbreak of pent-up energy, then attendant conditions are almost inevitably distressing and destructive of many values we would conserve. By intelligent planning and by utilizing other avenues of change, we could have prevented the dynamic pressure from becoming explosive and have assured that the territorial changes, if they ultimately proved inevitable, would have occurred as a matured development, naturally and easily, without shock or violence.

One of the great difficulties that confronts us is the fact that, as each change has occurred in the past, there has been an attendant feeling that it instituted a definite settlement, for all time, of the subject matter. Those concerned have felt such a relief at solution that they have been tempted to tie

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it up so that it could never again become untied to trouble them. The human race craves certainty and precision. It treats the world as a basket in which are placed packages, each wrapped, labeled and tied in its separate container. International change has deliberately been made difficult and something to be accomplished only by formalities often out of all relation to the real significance of the change. It has been thought that permanence would thereby be gained.

In international affairs—as indeed elsewhere—we should seek to abolish any sense of finality. “Never” and “forever” are words which should be eliminated from the vocabulary of statesmen.

We need to develop in world affairs a feeling that change is not, *per se*, something abnormal and strange and to be avoided except as a matter of dire necessity. Rather we should look upon change, at least in certain phases of the national domains, as normal and not something about which the world must become greatly excited. This would become possible if we could develop in international affairs a viewpoint corresponding to that which is epitomized by the common law. No one knows with precision what the common law is. No one can tell at what precise moment it changes, and the many changes which have occurred have not, in detail, been spectacular. We find here conformity with the criterion we suggested, namely, that change should preferably be almost imperceptible except in retrospect. When legal rulings showed signs of undue rigidity, then there was implanted upon it “equity”—the Chancellor’s conscience.

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The basic conception was that human rights are changing things which could not with advantage be made the subject of meticulous and permanent definition. This common law conception has to a very large extent contributed to make possible the two most striking cases of the peaceful evolution of international situations. One, to which we have already alluded, is the United States of America. Except for the Civil War, which occurred some seventy-five years ago, there have been one hundred and sixty years of peace, during which numerous sovereign states have gradually merged in effect into a single nation. The relations of the states were, to be sure, initially defined by treaty—the Constitution. But this prescribed a regime so elastic and was itself an instrument of such general terms that it has proved possible thereunder for momentous evolutions gradually to occur. It is certain that those who drafted the Constitution never conceived of such political changes as have taken place. Nevertheless, the flexibility of what they created was such as to permit these peacefully to occur.

The other illustration is afforded by the British Empire. For one hundred and sixty years there has been peace as between its principal component elements,¹ and during this period these elements have gradually evolved toward separate nations. This became possible because England in this period did not seek to crystallize by precise compact the status of the Dominions and colonies and their relations to the mother

¹The relations between England and Ireland have not been entirely peaceful and there have occurred certain native rebellions. In no case, however, have such hostilities attained the dignity of formal belligerency.

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country. Had she done so, peaceful evolution would have proved difficult, if not impossible.

We have thus seen in areas which embrace a large and diversified part of the population and wealth of the world, and where many international complications were involved, two evolutionary trends. These have been quite opposite in character, one working toward centralization and the other toward decentralization. But both trends have developed gradually and, with but one major and a few minor exceptions, without violence over a span of one and a half centuries. It cannot be a mere coincidence that these peaceful evolutions have occurred in areas of the world where there prevailed common law concepts rather than an addiction to codification. Those peoples which have led the world in political evolution were content with a scheme of things which had elements of vagueness and where each right was not meticulously defined by codes of indefinite duration.²

The history of the United States and the British Empire suggests that peaceful and non-disturbing evolution could occur in the world as a whole if we had fewer treaties, and if those which we had were less permanent and more conducive to the development of a flexible body of international practice which might ultimately become so grounded in the *mores* of the world community as to attain the status of law.

We have not been specific with respect to the constitution

² This can scarcely be said of the United States at the present time where there has recently developed a strong trend to codification. It is even sought by "restatement" to crystallize common law and equity.

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of those bodies which we suggest might serve as the germ of an international authority. The League naturally first suggests itself because it is an existing organization and already contains within its constitution provisions which are appropriate to the end which we have in mind. However, for reasons which we have noted, the League may now be unacceptable as a medium for dealing with the problem in its totality. If the initial effort is to divide the task in accordance with geographical areas, as heretofore suggested, then there may be an arrangement appropriate to each such area and such arrangements might differ as between themselves. It is obviously desirable that there should be a formality which gives assurance of continuity and that the status accorded those persons who have the duty of study and report should be, so far as practicable, independent and divorced from the exigencies of national politics.

There is, however, no occasion now to deal with all the intricacies of implementing our concept. The concept must first become one which public opinion understands and wants to realize. It is generally easy to find ways to do that which we want to do, whereas the most perfect machinery in the world will not be used if it is not understood or if its product is not wanted. The League is an example. It may be that it is not yet practicable to make even a tentative and experimental beginning of an international authority. In that case, and indeed even if such a beginning is made, much must be left to the independent responsibility and initiative of the nations themselves. Any authorities must inevitably be feeble at their inception. Their first task will be to main-

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tain their existence and secure for themselves an opportunity to evolve. They will fail in this if they seek at their inception to play a dominating role or to assume the full responsibility for promoting changes deemed necessary for the preservation of peace. There may be little that they can promptly achieve and there will even be a probationary period when there will be doubt as to the sincerity and practicability of the effort represented thereby.

Thus the individual nations, both static and dynamic, have now, and cannot quickly shift, a responsibility for contributing in their several ways to the creation of conditions conducive to peace. The details of such responsibility will vary with each nation, but in each case it will involve a sacrifice of certain national desires as a contribution to an end which is more desirable, namely, the avoidance of international violence.

Personified nations, as we have seen, can be classified roughly between those which primarily desire to retain that which they have and those which primarily desire to enhance their domain. In this respect they are like human beings who can be similarly classified. We have also seen that "peace" as between such individuals constitutes a regime of compromise between these two desires. Those whose primary wish is to retain must accept conditions wherein some of their advantages may gradually be subtracted from them. Those whose primary wish is to acquire must accept a condition whereby their ambitions can be realized only slowly and with moderation. This is the same compromise to which each nation which desires to avoid violence must

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contribute and, in the absence of an authority, must voluntarily contribute.

In arriving at the necessary compromise, the "satisfied" nations cannot disclaim the responsibility of initiative. This is so if for no other reason than that the peoples of such countries can be expected to possess better judgment and act more normally and rationally than those which are emotionally aroused in consequence of what they have conceived to be undue restraint. On the other hand, those nations which feel that the existing treaty structure still thwarts the realization of worthy ambitions cannot expect that all will be quickly undone and the world remade to meet their views and permit the prompt achievement of their maximum ambitions. If they would avoid violence they must moderate and restrain their ambitions and accept conditions which permit their position gradually to be improved. It is natural to ask: is this probable? Will the dynamic powers accept and cooperate in such a program as we suggest? Or would it merely incite demands for changes which are premature, excessive and destructive of values we are entitled to conserve?

There can be no doubt but that, for a time at least, our program would have been eagerly embraced by the dynamic powers. But today we are again confronted with the typical problem of excessive delay. By the time we are ready to meet past demands, new demands have arisen. In some of the dynamic states, leadership and the character of the nation-hero have become super-dynamic. Moderation will be difficult to achieve. There are many internal elements which would oppose and seek to sabotage any reasonable system

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of peaceful change. They have attained power on the waves of a revolt against non-change, and the foundations of their power would crumble in the face of a new world philosophy. Hitler can now proclaim, as he did in Czechoslovakia: German rights have never been recognized and granted by others; to the extent that we have realized them it has been through our own will and our own might. If such a boast were no longer possible, many internal changes in Germany would be inevitable. Those who would be displaced by such changes will assuredly seek to prevent them by all the means in their power. One of their techniques would doubtless be the making of exaggerated demands.

Furthermore, at the beginning there would be genuine distrust. The Allied philosophy identifying peace and world order with the *status quo* has been so long impressed upon the world that mere words would not suffice to carry conviction of change. Just as it is felt that Article 19 of the League Covenant has for twenty years existed on paper, but not in fact, so it would be felt that any new program might prove to be a verbal expression only, perhaps a mere device to prolong that perpetuation of the *status quo* which has heretofore been the dominant *motif* of the World War victors. If, however, there were genuine acceptance by the *status quo* powers of a new philosophy, this in itself would have a profound influence. The abnormal intensifications of "national will" which have developed in certain nations are largely a reaction to the *status quo* philosophy with which they have been confronted. The ambitious and dynamic powers bitterly resent a dominant world philosophy under

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which peace and international morality are equated with the preservation of rigidities which for long operated, as they believe, to protect selfishness and to prolong inequities. The mere abandonment by the *status quo* powers of such a philosophy would soon, if not at once, assure a new and healthier relationship.

One other factor deserves consideration. The employment of force to produce death and suffering is repellent to most human beings. To be sure, there exist in every country those who glorify force in the abstract. Of these there are some who are personally attracted to risk and danger and an environment of violence. Their number can be and has been increased by a planned indoctrination, particularly of youth. However, the preponderant part of every population would still feel at heart a tremendous sense of release if the plausible excuses for totalitarian war were done away with. One of the most striking facts developed by the Czechoslovak crisis was the enormous sense of relief felt by the peoples of all countries involved, not excluding Germany and Italy, at the passing of the crisis.

Finally, it is to be borne in mind that no state is all dynamic any more than is any state all static. In each there exist both dynamic and static elements. Among the static elements—those who are reasonably "satisfied"—the *mores* are opposed to force. Any elastic system which is soundly conceived and operated is bound to create satisfactions of a kind which will diminish the dynamic preponderance. As this occurs there will be inevitable changes in the characteristics of the nation-

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hero and of the group authority which purports to be its spokesman.

If a philosophy of non-change is unsound and provocative, a philosophy of pure change is equally so. Change of itself is no cure-all. In *some* form, elasticity is an essential ingredient of any condition of non-violence. This fact needs to be brought home to those peoples which, satisfied with their international position, tend to equate peace with rigidity. It is on that account that the emphasis of this study primarily stresses the inevitability of change. But it must not be forgotten that the objective of a regime of flexibility is to assure a qualified conservation of the existing status. The so-called static peoples have rights which must be protected and conserved and which rank equally with those of the dynamic peoples. Insecurity, of a kind, must be accepted as the price of a security which is more highly prized. But if the latter security is not achieved, then the insecurity has been accorded in vain. Change should be formulated in the light of this dual role. It should serve to protect, as well as to accord. This means, as we have seen, that change ought to be adapted to building up static influences within the dynamic states.

It is difficult to assure of change being calculated to take such constructive forms if it is extemporized to meet the requirements of an emergency situation. Last minute changes, as we have noted, have to be more farreaching than if the need is anticipated; also public opinion is then aroused and concession assumes the character of surrender. Under such

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circumstances change is apt to fail to conserve rights of the static powers which are of a kind which change should serve to conserve.

We do not disguise from ourselves the practical difficulties in the way of achieving change which is timely and which, because it is timely, can be moderate. It is hard for the political leaders of any static nation to commit their people to changes which, at the time, seem avoidable, or at least susceptible of being passed on to the next political administration. It is equally hard for the political leaders of any dynamic nation to agree to the postponement of a change which seems presently attainable. It is because of the reluctance of human beings to make voluntary concessions or to moderate voluntarily their demands, that the impartial "authority" has been invented and given the duty of initiative and of arbitrament. But until there is an effectively functioning international authority, the various states must anticipate and voluntarily do that which an authority would presumably propose and at the time when an authority would presumably propose it. This is not easy, but becomes possible with public education as to the true nature of peace. The potentialities of public opinion are indicated by the widespread popular support which, in the United States, has been accorded the Hull trade program in the belief that its long-range effect will be to open up the world to greater equality of individual opportunity and thereby promote the cause of peace.

The complexity of the true nature of peace has led the world into a dilemma from which it will with difficulty ex-

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tricate itself. Rigidities have been perpetuated which have led to an accumulation of dynamic pressures which threaten explosion. The particular changes which best serve to meet immediate crises usually fail to conform to those standards which make change constructive and in the interest of permanent peace. They are apt to contain defects of the same kind, if not to the same degree, as those which characterize violent change.

Changes may be justified by expediency, since war would assuredly be more destructive and the breeder of more follies. But if in this way catastrophe can be postponed, no time should be lost in elevating change to a higher plane such that it can be dealt with wisely, under conditions conducive to the achievement of the desired objective, namely, the attainment of organic elasticity which will cushion the world against shock and provide qualified and balanced satisfaction for both static and dynamic elements.



XI

CONCLUSION

THE problem of war is one that can be dealt with. It is by nature no different from like problems with which we deal familiarly and with sureness of touch. The essential difference is one of magnitude. Neither the ethical solution nor the political solution has been developed to operate with full vigor in the universal field. This cannot be expected without changes in human nature and in the existing organization of the world.

This fact need not, however, discourage us or call for a suspension of effort. It does, of course, mean that we cannot now attain a solution which is perfect or final. But it is rare indeed that this is possible when human nature in the mass is an essential ingredient of the problem. In such cases any practical procedure must accept, without radical change, the existing *mores* and structure of society.

In accordance with this principle, we have assumed that emotion rather than reason would continue to be the main-spring of human action. We have assumed that individual acts of unselfishness could not be projected far beyond the range of personal association, and that mass sacrifice must be inspired primarily by identification with some ideology of

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conflict. We have accepted the fact of a world of sovereign nations governed by authorities owing no duty to each other or to other peoples.

We have accepted these and like premises not because we believe that they are admirable, but because they exist. The ideology of nationalism has developed characteristics which threaten our destruction. If this peril is to be avoided we must follow those lines which offer a prospect of some early alleviation of the existing tensions. From this standpoint we have sought to analyze the forces now operating to bring about totalitarian war in the hope of finding a practical way to divert them. This analysis indicates that any effective procedures should be designed to:

- check the tendency to identify one's personified state with deity;
- check the tendency to identify the other-nation personality with evil;
- deal with national boundaries so as to obviate the obsessions and abnormalities consequent upon a sense of arbitrary restraint and to do away with exaggerated subservience to one's own state as the sole source of economic opportunity;
- secure through voluntary action (or preferably through the medium of an impartial international agency) such elasticity in the treaty structure of the world as would avoid rigidities which cannot but be broken by the inexorable requirements of change.

The foregoing procedures meet the test of practicability

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which we have laid down. There exist religious and humanitarian organizations well qualified to vitalize ideals which will transcend national lines. There are peace organizations and organizations for the dissemination of information on foreign affairs which can do much to dissipate the other-nation-villain ideology. There exists powerful backing, both popular and commercial, for so handling boundaries as to dissipate the sense of arbitrary economic restraints. Article 19 of the Covenant of the League represents the present commitment of a majority of the nations of the world, and there is increasing popular understanding of and sympathy with its concept that the treaty structure of the world should be deemed elastic, not static.

If some appreciable progress could be made along the lines we propose, we would have measurably dissipated the particular forces which presently threaten totalitarian war. But if through such measures we can gain time, that time should be utilized also to attack those basic assumptions which, as a matter of practicality, have been provisionally accepted.

It should not be permanently accepted that human action should be dictated by emotion to the virtual exclusion of reason. Modern scientific inventions have, to be sure, greatly facilitated the transmission of emotional stimuli. But the mere fact that emotion has been made easy does not mean that it should be made supreme. There must be continuous effort to restore individual reason to its proper position of control over human action.

We should not accept as permanent a situation wherein

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only a few are motivated by a broad sense of duty to fellow-men, and wherein those who have a corporate responsibility—whether as group authorities or company trustees—are deemed immune from the application of broad ethical concepts of the general welfare.

We should not acquiesce in human nature being such that mass effort and sacrifice are largely dependent upon the ideology of conflict.

We should not accept the increasing tendency of the group authority to destroy individual freedom and initiative. It is particularly important that the intellectual freedom of the individual be preserved. Only from such a source can we expect the originality of thought necessary to cope with those crises which successively arise as social concepts, useful in their origin, are carried to dangerous extremes. We should not accept the present form of world organization as embodying the ultimate possibilities of the conception of a commonwealth.

There are many who are consecrated to bringing about change in the foregoing respects. It must be recognized that the task thus undertaken is fundamental. It must be pursued concurrently with programs of shorter range. Only as progress is made in these basic respects will it be possible more boldly and more surely to attack and solve the last international phase of the primitive problem of eliminating force as the solvent of conflicting desires.

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